Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 4

Article

6-1-2016

Private Requitals
Bailey Kuklin
Brooklyn Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Bailey Kuklin, Private Requitals, 64 Clev. St. L. Rev. 965 (2016)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

PRIVATE REQUITALS
BAILEY KUKLIN*
ABSTRACT
Previously, I examined the establishment of a person’s substantive rights and,
correlatively, duties. But this was only the first step. This Article addresses the
second step: the means for recognizing requital rights violations, including their
articulation, adoption, and implementation. Taking a deontic, individualistic
perspective on rights, this Article aims to delineate and protect one’s personal
freedom, one’s autonomy. To do so, this Article, using a formal understanding of the
categorical imperative, will examine whether an agent’s chosen maxims are
deontically acceptable. The maxims need to be both first-order, substantive ones that
establish autonomy boundary baselines, and second-order, requital ones that address
violations of the baselines. Important elements in perhaps all maxims, both first- and
second-order, are the notions of harm, wrongfulness, and blameworthiness. Once an
agent’s substantive and requital maxims are properly in place and honored, she is
truly in a position to be an autonomous person.
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INTRODUCTION
“You can’t do that to me. I’ll sue! I’ve got my rights!” Versions of this plea,
demand, threat, commonly begin the myriad of disputes that end up in litigation.
Implicit in this complaint are a series of questions that must be resolved before the
accuser can obtain relief, including: What are a person’s rights? How are they
established? What remedies are available for rights violations? How are these
correctives instituted?
In a prior article, I addressed the first two of these questions regarding the
establishment of a person’s substantive rights and, correlatively, duties.1 Taking a
deontic, individualistic perspective on rights, I detailed the process by which an
agent adopts a scheme of substantive rights and duties for herself and, under the
universalization mandate of Kant’s categorical imperative, for everyone else. But
this was only the first step. The scheme is not fully in place until the means for
recognizing requitals for rights violations is also articulated, adopted, and
implemented. Picking up some pieces of this process mentioned in the prior article,
aspects of this second step are the primary focus of this Article.
The continued quest in this Article for the delineation and protection of one’s
realm of freedom, one’s autonomy, begins with a brief examination of the meanings
of autonomy. To judge whether an agent’s chosen maxims are deontically
acceptable, I invoke as the standard a formal understanding of the categorical
imperative, as do most other commentators. Under this understanding, the requisites
of acceptable maxims are broadly framed; it is up to each agent to adopt material
principles that fit within this framework. The maxims need to be both first-order,
substantive ones that establish autonomy boundary baselines, and second-order,
requital ones that address violations of the baselines. With a few exceptions an
agent’s consent allows for the adjustment of her established baselines. In drawing
these boundaries the agent aims to balance her liberty and security interests.
Important elements in perhaps all maxims, both first- and second-order, are the
notions of harm, wrongfulness, and blameworthiness. For requitals in private law,
corrective justice is the standard gauge. For public, criminal law, it is retribution.
Much of this Article constitutes a survey of the range of plausible maxims for
consideration by an agent. Since substantive and requital maxims are typically
deeply intertwined, as a matter of expediency I sometimes dwell upon the
substantive maxims rather than their requital complements. The substantive ones
tend to spark more controversy. Among the normative topics examined are
intentional harmful conduct, truth telling and promise keeping, reliance and
expectations, exploitation, risk imposition, and existing social norms. Once an
agent’s substantive and requital maxims are properly in place and honored, she is
truly in a position to be an autonomous person.
I. AUTONOMY
In a deontic regime, personal autonomy is of paramount moment. An
autonomous person is, in a nutshell, one who is self-governed.2 Metaphorically, she
controls an autonomy space in which she is free to act without interference from
others. Personal autonomy, however, is not a pre-existing condition protected by
1

See Bailey Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 375 (2015).

2

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE 214 (2009); Kuklin, supra note 1, at 385-86.
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legal and moral norms. To the contrary, legal and moral norms are what establish the
parameters of personal autonomy by consensually circumscribing a moral agent’s
realm of freedom. This freedom entails a balancing of two interrelated interests: the
liberty to choose one’s conduct without interference from others; and, the security
from interference by other people’s choices or conduct.3 These two interests are
often in tension. The expansion of one person’s liberty curtails other people’s
security, and vice versa.4
We can distinguish different types or degrees of autonomy space. At one end of
the spectrum is hypothetical autonomy space.5 This approaches an ideal in which an
agent has all the necessary resources, external and internal, to engage in whatever
acceptable conduct she chooses.6 Somewhat more limited, except for the occasional
Midas or demigod, is formal autonomy space.7 An agent’s freedom here is limited in
principle only by the established legal and moral norms, though in practice her
resources may prevent her from exercising various avenues within this space, as
where a person is financially unable to purchase a desired yacht. At the far end of the
spectrum, possibly, is material autonomy space.8 An agent’s actual resources
circumscribe this. An impecunious, homeless person, for example, has a material
autonomy space that is very constricted in practice. These three notions of autonomy
space offer different perspectives of an agent’s freedom. In addressing an agent’s
claims to autonomy and establishing her proper requitals for autonomy invasions,
these perspectives become relevant. For example, does respect for another’s
autonomy require the provision of a minimal level of resources (e.g., welfare) to
ensure that an agent’s material autonomy space suffices for her to engage in a
substantial range of quotidian activities? Is the discriminatory refusal to sell a yacht
to another person because of her ethnicity a remediable autonomy invasion if she did
not have the resources to make the purchase in any case? Is retributive punishment to
account for the fact that the autonomy space of a Midas is materially constricted to a
much greater degree by a particular jail sentence than is the case of an equal sentence
for an impoverished agent?
In working out the proper reach of an agent’s autonomy space, Kant’s categorical
imperative grounds today’s dominant mechanism for gauging a proper balance
between liberty and security.9 This imperative declares that each person, by virtue of
her rational capacity, is an ethical being of priceless value whose dignity is entitled

3

Kuklin, supra note 1, at 380-81.

4
Id. at 386-87. When we are nearby, the greater my liberty to swing my fist as I please,
the less is your security from being assaulted or battered.
5

Id. at 409.

6

Id. at 409-10.

7

Id. at 410-11.

8

Id. at 412-13.

9

See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353,
393 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1797) [hereinafter KANT,
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS] (“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a
universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.”).
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to respect by others.10 As a moral agent, one has the right to be respected by others
and the duty to respect other moral agents.11 A formal, strongly individualistic
understanding of this declaration, which I embrace here, implies that each person has
the freedom to choose her own maxims of conduct to balance her perceived interests
in liberty and security. Under one form of the categorical imperative, each maxim
must be universalizable.12 It must apply equally to both the maxim adopter and to
everyone else. Otherwise, a lack of allotted equality implies an improper lack of
respect. Yet universalization must be distinguished from generalization. A
universalized maxim may apply to a restrict range of persons (e.g., family or
coworkers) or situations (e.g., snowboarding), or it may apply very generally (e.g.,
charity).13
As a matter of logic and functionality, an agent’s chosen maxims must constitute
a complete and coherent set that resolves any potential conflicts among them.
Because each person’s set of individual maxims may be inconsistent with those of
others, as a practical matter there must be a means to resolve these differences and
coordinate behavior. Yet, from an individualistic perspective, one should be bound
to maxims only of one’s own choosing.14 Kant, astutely, did not push his
individualistic foundation this far. He invoked a nonconsensual social contract as a
synchronizing device.15 Modern Kantians, including John Rawls, tend to rely upon a
social contract founded on a weak or fictional form of consent, such as tacit or
hypothetical agreement, or on concepts such as fairness.16 This central, controversial
issue I leave to others.17 For purposes of this Article, I accept that a properly deontic
state and community are the arbiters of norms. They should, of course, embrace my
guidance.
With the above preliminaries in mind, a rational, autonomous agent is in a
position to consider the adoption of maxims. She must first attend to those that
demarcate substantive rights and duties. These focus on the underlying balance
between basic liberty and security interests. She must also attend to requital maxims
10

“[A] human being regarded as a person . . . is [ ] to be valued . . . as an end in itself, that
is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself
from all other rational beings in the world.” Id. at 186.
11

Kuklin, supra note 1, at 383-84.

12

Id. at 390.

13

See id. at 421-23; infra note 132.

14

For further elaboration of this basic framework, see Kuklin, supra note 1, at 383-93.

15

See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 451, 457-59; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 198-204 (2001); JOHN
RAWLS, Justice as Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 71 n.22 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)
(Kant “interpreted the original contract merely as an ‘Idea of Reason’”).
16

See generally BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); Fred
D’Agostino et al., Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ (last visited May 8,
2016).
17
I duck this issue as one of the most intractable in all of political theory. None of the
current theories to resolve it are fully satisfactory, in my view, in an individualistic, deontic
realm.
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that respond to violations of the substantive maxims. The consequences of violations
must be established to fully flesh out one’s autonomy space, one’s range of freedom.
In adopting substantive maxims, an agent will naturally consider harms that
conduct may engender. For if conduct does not produce any harms, there is no
apparent reason to challenge the agent’s liberty to engage in it. When harms do
ensue, the security interests of those impacted come to bear. But some harms are
typically not seen as wrongful. For example, in capitalistic societies the harms that
ensue from fair business practices are not considered unjust, nor are those that arise
from the common, inevitable bumps into others on crowded sidewalks. Though
harms, these are not legally cognizable injuries. Theoreticians often embrace a “harm
principle” to distinguish sanctionable harms from others.18 Physical, psychic, and
economic harms are the three standard types that receive extensive protection under
current law.19 A fourth type of harm, which often flies below the radar of existing
legal and moral norms, is dignitary harm. In my view, to the contrary, dignitary harm
should get pride of place in the deontic realm we are exploring.20 Priceless individual
dignity is the bedrock of the categorical imperative. Disrespect of that dignity is a
paramount instance of an autonomy invasion.21
For the establishment of requital maxims, a sophisticated modern agent is likely
to turn to Aristotle and Kant. In the context of private law, Aristotle’s concept of
corrective justice holds sway.22 In public, criminal law, retribution, championed by
Kant, predominates.23 Both of these concepts will be discussed below.
As suggested by the basic deontic principles already introduced, several key,
sometimes nebulous, essentially contested concepts are likely to require meticulous
delineation, including: dignity, respect, autonomy, liberty, security, and harm.
Another similarly contestable concept, blameworthiness, is central to most current
discussions of fair responsibility. This concept is of particular concern in this Article.
Short of absolute or strict liability, if such are acceptable, blameworthiness is
connected to most, if not all, legal and moral principles of interest.24
Blameworthiness in a deontic regime has, as I see it, two important aspects, each
with two prongs. First, as Aristotle advances, there is “responsibility
blameworthiness.”25 An agent is not responsible for her choices and conduct insofar
as they are a product of ignorance or coercion.26 Such a choice or conduct is not a
fully free one. It is not fair to hold one liable for unavoidably unforeseeable or forced
18

See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 10-14, 26-27 (1988); JOHN STUART MILL,
On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81, 176-200
(1869); Kuklin, supra note 1, at 416-19.
19

See generally Kuklin, supra note 1, at 429-45.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 381.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 446-47.

26

See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, in THE BASIC WORKS
1015-16 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
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outcomes.27 Both prongs, ignorance and coercion, may be a product of sources or
forces that are internal or external to the agent, or a combination of the two. For
instance, internal ignorance may stem from cognitive dissonance or self-deception,
while internal coercion may come from insanity, impulse, or akrasia. External
ignorance may ensue from fraud or deception, while external coercion may result
from physical constraint or economic pressure.
Second, as manifest in Kant’s categorical imperative, there is “disrespect
blameworthiness.”28 The two prongs of this form of blameworthiness are, first, a
disrespectful attitude towards another agent (e.g., a personal sense of moral
superiority) and, second, a disrespectful treatment of another agent.29 The denial of
another’s rights, for example, may be a product of the actor’s belief that the other
person is inferior (e.g., racial or religious discrimination). Indeed, the disrespectful
27
Some commentators, unpersuaded by this argument, adopt a principle of “outcome
responsibility.” This is a form of strict liability. “The idea that those who expose others to
risks are responsible for the outcomes they cause has considerable appeal. Kant says that those
who do wrong ‘play a game of chance with the agency of others.’” ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 65 (1999); see also ANDREWS REATH, Agency and
the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics, in AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S
MORAL THEORY 250 (2006). For advocates of strict outcome responsibility, see, for example,
Peter Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in THE LAW OF
OBLIGATION 141 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998); TONY HONORE, Responsibility and
Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, in RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14 (1999). “A variety
of principles, including non-reciprocity of risk or benefit, protection of legitimate
expectations, or a Kantian requirement of internalizing externalities, can justify liability for
non-faulty conduct.” Kenneth W. Simons, Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law:
A Critique and Reformulation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 862 (1992) (footnotes
omitted). Responsible agency, under Aristotle, requires sufficient freedom from ignorance and
coercion, which the strict liability of outcome responsibility may not. Honore contends that,
“outcome allocation is crucial to our identity as persons . . . .” HONORE, supra, at 27. But, to
say nothing of coercion, the idea that a person’s identity turns on holding her accountable for
“unavoidable accidents” from choices made in ignorance of risks (unforeseeability) seems
weak, counterintuitive. For strong criticism of standard outcome responsibility, see, for
example, JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 199 (2006); Stephen Perry, Loss,
Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT
THEORY 24 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Stephen R. Perry,
Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF
TORTS 72 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter, Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes];
Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation, and Moral Responsibility, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 347 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Allan Beever,
Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 48491 (2008). “In strict liability, the protection of the plaintiff’s right cuts off the defendant’s
moral power to actualize his or her purposive capacity, so that the vindication of the plaintiff’s
agency comes at the price of denying the defendant’s.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 182-83 (1995). “[T]he theoretical case for basing tort liability on the causation
of harm without fault is inconsistent with the equality and correlativity of corrective justice
and with the concept of agency that underlies Kantian right.” Id. at 203.
28

Kuklin, supra note 1, at 449-50.

29

See, e.g., THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL
THEORY 55 (1992); Allen Wood, Humanity as End in Itself, in 2 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS 58, 62-63 (2011); Kuklin, supra note 1, at 449-54; Robin S. Dillon, Respect, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect (last visited May 8, 2016).
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attitude alone, even without conduct manifesting it, suffices to abridge the mandate
to be respectful of others.30 On the other hand, an agent may have the utmost regard
for another person, but still treat her disrespectfully by denying her a particular right.
For instance, one might paternalize a stout loved one by nonconsensually hiding her
sweets to keep her from temptation.
The mapping of an agent’s autonomy space through the adoption of legal and
moral maxims, both substantive and requital, entails the establishment of rights and
duties. Before turning our attention to the establishment of maxims, particularly the
requital ones of primary interest in this Article, it will be useful to consider the
nature of rights and duties.
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Rights and duties may be negative or positive. Negative rights generally relate to
the protection of the right-holder’s security.31 Positive rights generally relate to the
liberty of the right-holder to choose and act.32 In the following section, rights and
duties that satisfy the categorical imperative are referred to as deontic ones. The
deontic rights and duties considered here, like the non-deontic ones (e.g., utility
rights), are treated as Hohfeldian correlatives.33 In this section, I briefly discuss
rights and duties from two overlapping perspectives: deontic and consensual.
A. Deontic Rights and Duties
The source of relevant deontic rights and duties is the maxims within the
categorical imperative embraced by a moral agent.34 An agent embraces a maxim
when she chooses, adopts, acts on, or explicitly consents to it. Under the formal
interpretation of the categorical imperative accepted by most commentators,35 there
30

Dillon, supra note 29.

31

See Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of Accidents, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 22-23.
32
For brief summaries of other, associated notions of positive and negative liberty and
rights, and active and passive ones, see Kuklin supra note 1, at 390-92.
33

See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23 (1923). While Hohfeld distinguishes
claim-right/duty, liberty (privilege)/no-right, power/liability, and immunity/disability, unless
relevant, I will lump these together as rights and duties. Kant did not see deontic rights and
duties as Hohfeldian correlatives. For other differences as well between Hohfeld and Kant, see
Nikolai Lazarev, Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a Conceptual and
Practical Understanding of the Nature of Rights, 12 MURDOCH UNIV. ELECT. J. L. (2005),
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.html. For general doubts about the
correlativity, see, for example, David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 NOÛS
45, 45 (1970).
34
For a discussion of Kant’s notion of duties, see generally ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN
ETHICS 158-81 (2008).
35
Some commentators disagree. “In response to the traditional Hegelian objection that
[“the universal law version of the Categorical Imperative”] is purely formal and empty of
content, a number of theorists sympathetic to Kant have ably made the case that [some forms
of the Categorical Imperative have] important and substantive moral implications.” ANDREWS
REATH, Agency and Universal Law, in AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY,
supra note 27, at 196, 196 (citing ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON (1989);
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is no particular maxim that every agent must adopt.36 Unlike Kant’s perfect (narrow)
obligations from adopted maxims, Kant’s imperfect (wide) obligations do not
themselves create claims by identifiable individuals.37 These imperfect obligations
include duties of virtue, such as the duty of general beneficence and selfdevelopment.38 No one can claim a right to another person’s duty of virtue. The duty
of virtue, then, does not by itself create a Hohfeldian right. An agent, in recognition
of an imperfect duty, may make a commitment to another person. A promise to make
a charitable contribution is an example. Once this occurs, the agent’s consent may
create a correlative right in that other person, as from a maxim of promise keeping,
unlike the imperfect duty by itself.
Adopted maxims relate to facets of an agent’s moral realm.39 Initially there are
substantive, first-order maxims, such as, “do not batter another person.” Then there
are second-order, requital maxims that stem from conceptions of corrective justice or
retribution, such as, “one must compensate wrongfully harmed persons to the extent
of the harm.” These second-order maxims are invoked after there is a violation of
first-order maxims.40 Together, first- and second-order maxims demarcate a person’s

BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 6–7, 10 (1993); CHRISTINE
KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS (1996); JOHN RAWLS, Kant, Lecture II, in
LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (2000)); see also, e.g., RIPSTEIN, supra
note 15, at 383; Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, in 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 61, 86 (2007)
(“there are some things, such as murder, that the state must define as crimes”).
36

See, e.g., THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Pains and Projects: Justifying to Oneself, in AUTONOMY
SELF-RESPECT 173, 178 (1991). “At any given moment there may be and usually are an
indefinite number of permissible maxims [that are within the Categorical Imperative] on
which we may act.” ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY 51 (1989).

AND

37

See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1785)
[hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK].
38

See, e.g., id. at 41, 53-54, 74-75; KANT, METAPHYSICS
512-40, 572.

OF

MORALS, supra note 9, at

39

Hurd “distinguish[es] at least five deontological positions (some possessing several
variations) concerning the objects of categorical imperatives, and hence five possible positions
concerning the nature of deontological wrongdoing. Put succinctly, the categorical
imperatives of deontology may prohibit certain (1) motivations, (2) deliberations, (3)
intentions, (4) tryings, or (5) actions.” Heidi Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 163 (1994) (footnote omitted). Kant is often said to adopt the
first position. See id. at 165.
40
Corrective justice “holds that in the event certain conditions attend the breach [of duties
towards others], a second order duty of repair exists. Whereas the underlying duties of care
establish in part normative relations between the parties, the breach of such a duty creates a
different but related normative relationship.” Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
26,
Tort
Law,
STAN.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/tort-theories (last visited May 8, 2016); see
also ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1007-10; IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN TIMES 185 (2009). Pursuant to Kant, “a publicly
assured enforceable right to compensation can guarantee that your right will be effective, even
if I violate it, because the object of the right will once again be subject to your choice.”
RIPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 166.
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autonomy space.41 In other words, one’s autonomy space is determined not only by
her liberty and security freedom as delineated by substantive maxims, but also by the
cognizable remedial claims for violations of the substantive maxims.42 To twist a
Roman law maxim, “without a remedy, there is no right,”43 or, correlatively, a duty.
Under the view that the categorical imperative is a formal concept, a moral agent
must adopt a complete and coherent set of deontic maxims, both first- and secondorder, that satisfies the wide constraints of the categorical imperative.44 When an
agent adopts maxims, she may violate one of her substantive maxims in a way that
falls within the reach of one of her requital maxims.45 If this occurs, a harmed party
(claimant) can claim that the agent (claimee) has violated her remediable duty to the
claimant. She has, by her own lights, wrongfully harmed him and owes him a
requital. Third parties may also be harmed, but not wrongfully harmed if they fall
outside the reach of any substantive or requital maxim adopted by the agent. For
example, unrelated observers of a battery are usually not entitled to bring a claim
against the tortfeasor though they may suffer psychic and other harms from her
conduct.
There are, in principle, an infinite number of complete and coherent sets of moral
maxims consistent with the categorical imperative.46 This enormously complicates
the standing of a person to claim a violation of her right under a claimee’s maxims.
For instance, if a person argues that his reasonable expectations, foreseeably aroused
by the claimee’s conduct, have been harmfully dashed, the claimee may deny that
41

John Austin refers to this distinction in terms of “primary” or “principal” and
“secondary” or “sanctioning” rights. See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE lecture
xlv (5th ed. 1885). “A wrong is the infringement of a primary right which generates a
secondary right, commonly but not always a liability to pay compensation.” ROBERT STEVENS,
TORTS AND RIGHTS 287 (2007) (internal citation omitted). Other labels have been used. See,
e.g., Kenneth Campbell, Legal Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 11-12,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights (last visited May 8, 2016) (“primary” and
“remedial” rights); Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Corrective Justice, 22 LAW & PHIL. 21,
28, 30 (2003) (“proscriptive and remedial duties”, or primary and secondary duties). For a
discussion of first- and second-order tort duties, see JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE 31-35 (2001). “Retributivism is not a theory of criminality; it is a theory about what
ought to be, or of what may legitimately be done by the state in those cases where a criminal
misdeed has been committed.” Id. at 33. “It presupposes an account of criminality, or at least
of list of what the crimes are.” Id.
42
“Remedies . . . participate in the constitution of the rights they help enforce . . . . Thus,
the choice of different remedies, as well as the possibility of incorporating qualifications,
limitations, and even obligations, allows private law to accommodate qualitative (and
normatively attractive) distinctions between different types of rights.” Hanoch Dagan,
Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2011). Regarding “the connection
between rights and remedies [in the context of contracts,] . . . the scope and limits of the
remedy affect the essential nature of the right.” Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies,
and the Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS. 194, 200 (2008).
43
The maxim, “ubi jus, ibi remedium,” translates, “Where there is a right, there is a
remedy.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1691 (4th ed. 1951). “It is said that the rule of primitive
law was the reverse: Where there is a remedy, there is a right.” Id.
44

Kuklin, supra note 1, at 381.

45

Id. at 381-82.

46

Id. at 458.
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she has adopted a relevant substantive maxim, or assert that the claimant’s aroused
expectations do not fall within the ambit of what the claimee meant in her adopted,
relevant maxim by “reasonable” or “foreseeable,”47 or that even if the claimant’s
expectations fall within the reach of her maxim, that her associated requital maxim
does not include damages (e.g., apology only required) or cover the type of alleged
harm (e.g., psychic).48 To get over this hurdle, the claimant may assert that the
claimee’s prior statements or conduct have manifested the adoption of maxims
supporting his claim, but this may often require an unrealistically detailed
knowledge of the claimee’s history. Even with this detailed knowledge, sufficiently
specifying the maxim so manifested offers notorious problems.49 The circumstances,
moreover, may be unusual enough that the claimee was never before in a situation in
which her choice of a relevant maxim was needed.50 Or perhaps two or more broad,
adopted maxims point to inconsistent conclusions requiring the claimee to refine one
or more of them to coherently accommodate the case at hand, some possible
refinements being protective of the claimant and others not.
Some maxims may be hard or virtually impossible to opt out of under the
categorical imperative. Malicious, unprovoked homicide always seems over the
line.51 Yet there is enough discretion about plausible maxims for it to be difficult for
a claimant to make out an individualized claim in many cases of alleged wrongful
harms.52 That reasonable people can rationally adopt different sets of moral maxims
47

“Any principle can be enacted or embodied or instituted in many different ways, among
which agents have to decide.” Onora O’Neill, Instituting Principles: Between Duty and
Action, in KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 331 (Mark Timmons ed., 2002). “One must look
to accounts of judgement for a view of the way in which the gap between principle and
particular act, or pattern of action, is to be bridged.” Id. at 332.
48

“[A]lthough others also can create rights through their unilateral will, no one can be
sure of how others interpret the extent of their respective rights or of whether they are willing
to abide by the rights of others.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of
Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 807 (2003). “[E]ach person is the judge of his or her
own entitlements, doing what seems right and good in his or her own eyes.” Id. at 808 (citing
KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 455-56).
49

“Now there are notorious difficulties in identifying the maxim of a particular action . . .
.” R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 201 (1986) (citation omitted). “A pattern of behavior
can never fully determine the content of a rule, because any pattern of behavior is consistent
with an indefinite number of different rules, each of which ‘covers’ past behavior, yet each of
which would result in different future behavior.” COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 80. “The
problem stems from the notorious difficulty of specifying the maxim of an action . . . . The
problem is that it is difficult to find any way of characterizing the proper description of the
maxim to be tested without relying upon one’s antecedent sense of how the test should come
out.” THOMAS E. HILL, JR., A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules, in RESPECT, PLURALISM,
AND JUSTICE 33, 40 (2000); see THOMAS E. HILL, JR., A Kantian Perspective on Political
Violence, in RESPECT, PLURALISM, AND JUSTICE, 200, 211-13 (2000). For an approach to
coming up with a set of maxims, see id. at 213-17.
50
As Kant suggests, “a requirement to enact a plurality of maxims may be stymied not
only by the indeterminacy of the maxims, but by agents’ uncertainty about their own
maxims?” O’Neill, supra note 47, at 338 n.13.
51

See supra note 35.

52

This is especially true when, as discussed below, infra note 120, the maxim claimed to
be violated includes “except when” provisos, for these are particularly variable.
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led Rawls in Political Liberalism to moderate some of his contentions previously
made in A Theory of Justice.53 Within our existing political realm, these
complications are solved by the state declaring which maxims control,54 often
irrespective of a contrary individual choice.55 This state solution remains in the
background as much as possible. Required deference to state solutions depends on a
theory of political obligation beyond the reach of this Article.56
53

“Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized not
simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines
is affirmed by citizens generally.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi (1993).
54
“In treating the parties as equals, corrective justice precludes either of them from
unilaterally determining the legal consequences of their relationship. Corrective justice
thereby requires that disputes be authoritatively resolvable by a third party . . . . [I]n our
culture, [it is] the judiciary . . . .” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 218. “An objective valuation of
interests can be morally justified on the ground that it treats both parties to the lawsuit equally,
whereas a subjective standard would let the injurer set the terms of the relationship
unilaterally.” Mark Geistfeld, Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort
Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 250, 260. An agent who
establishes the autonomy space boundary between her and others by adopting maxims does, in
one sense, treat the others as equals. She is consenting to the duties to others that she is
imposing on the others to her. If disputes over the boundary are turned over to a judge, the
judge is in the same position as were the private parties. She is imposing duties on others,
though again, she is accepting the duties for herself. If the disputants both agree to the judge’s
authority, then their consent solves the equality issue between them. But under the common
law, the judge’s ruling at the appellate level is generally binding on others within the
jurisdiction. The equality issue arises for them. They have not consented to the judge’s ruling
unless we find them bound to a consensual social contract. At this point in the inquiry, many
commentators, as I see it, simply wave their hands or offer consent arguments for the social
contract that I find unpersuasive in many situations. See supra notes 16-17 and discussion
therein. Kant found a nonconsensual social contract. See supra note 15. His rather bald
assertion looks like hand waving to me. On this issue, I wave my hands also.
55
Under Kant, “the state provides duly authorized institutions of adjudication and
enforcement. These replace the exercise of private judgment about controversial claims with
the authoritative judgments of courts that determine the scope of each person’s entitlements
according to what is laid down as right.” Weinrib, supra note 48, at 808-09 (Kant citations
omitted). “The civil condition is the product of a social contract, which is conceived not as an
historical occurrence, but as an idea ‘in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of
a state.’” Id. at 809 (Kant citations omitted); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 36 (1970). “The juridical state is a necessary public coercive institution
for individual agents who, coexisting in limited space, each unavoidably raise legitimate
freedom claims against one another, yet who, given their innate equality, lack legitimate
enforcement authority over one another.” Katrin Flikschuh, Kant’s Sovereignty Dilemma: A
Contemporary Analysis, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 469, 478 (2010). For the need and origin of the state
in Kant’s view, see SULLIVAN, supra note 36, at 233-45. See also LARRY ALEXANDER &
KIMBERLY K. FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 295-96 (2009) (“rules resolve[] problems of
coordination, expertise, and efficiency”); Japa Pallikkathayil, Deriving Morality from Politics:
Rethinking the Formula of Humanity, 121 ETHICS 116 (2010) (discussing the role of the state
as arbiter of deontic maxims).
56

“Contemporary political theory has not been kind to the view that citizens are obligated
to obey the law just because it is the law, even when they live in relatively just regimes.”
MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 72 (1997) (citations omitted). “My own view is that the
passage of a law prohibiting certain conduct adds nothing to our antecedent moral obligations
with respect to that conduct . . . .” Id. “My starting point is the assumption that there is no
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B. Consensual Rights and Duties (Obligations)
Consent is central to the moral theory embraced in this Article.57 Beyond the
consent required for the adoption of deontic maxims, an agent by virtue of her
consent may assume a particular duty to another person or forgo a particular right.
Consent to assume a duty or forgo a right adjusts the boundaries of one’s baseline
autonomy space.58 For example, consent to a specific touching may reduce one’s
otherwise protected realm of security.
Consent can establish or adjust boundaries having no prior legal or moral
standing. If a person joins a group, for instance, knowing that its rules require her to
bow down to its high muckamuck, then it is wrongful, even disrespectful, for her to
violate the rule, whereas it would not be without the consensual membership.59 Just
as consent is technically not a defense of privilege to intentional torts, but rather is
general obligation to obey the law, not even a prima facie obligation and not even in a just
society.” Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103, 103 (1981); see JOSEPH
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (rev. ed. 1994); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1981); Gerhard Overland, The Right to Do Wrong, 26 LAW &
PHIL. 377, 382-83 (2007) (citing M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey
the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973)). See generally Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002); Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political Obligation, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation (last visited May 8,
2016). “Although the lines that separate one theory from another are not always distinct,
philosophical justifications of political obligation nowadays usually take the form of
arguments from consent, gratitude, fair play, membership, or natural duty.” Id. at 24.
57
Some commentators distinguish moral duties, which arise irrespective of consent, from
obligations, which require consent. See, e.g., Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract
and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1614-15 (2009). “[S]pecial duties are duties that we
have only in respect of those particular people to whom we stand in a certain significant sort
of relation or with whom we have had certain significant sorts of interaction.” Overland, supra
note 56, at 385 (citing SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 49 (2001)).
“Many people do believe, as I do not, that their racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic
connections bestow associational rights and obligations.” RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS 324 (2011).
58
For limits to consent, such as to slavery or self-mutilation, see Kuklin, supra note 1, at
394. Existing criminal law is cautious about consent as a justification. “[T]he consent defense
in American criminal law, and in the Model Code, is not really a generally defense.” MARKUS
D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 242 (2002). “The reason generally cited for
limiting, or even rejecting, consent as a justification is that the criminal law, unlike torts, is
about ‘public wrongs,’ not ‘private wrongs’ . . . .” Id. at 243. Since my Kantian analysis
rejects wrongs to the public that are not wrongs to individual moral persons, I would grant
more room for consent in criminal law—until it becomes self-disrespectful, as in slavery
contracts.
59

“[A] person who wishes to be restricted in various ways, whether by the discipline of
the monastery, regimentation of the army, or even by coercion, is not, on that account alone,
less autonomous.” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 18 (1988).
Sheinman observes that the membership remains voluntary even though the joiner “does not
even know what these rules are before becoming a member.” Hanoch Sheinman, Contractual
Liability and Voluntary Undertakings, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 (2000). The
formal consent suffices.
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the basis of a claim that, because of the consent, there was no relevant duty to begin
with,60 so allowable consent to an adjustment of a baseline autonomy space affects a
later assertion that the consenter’s autonomy space was invaded. Because of the
consent, there is no wrongful harm.61 Consent not only factors into conceptions of
wrongful harm, but it also factors into those of blameworthiness. When properly
consented to, one is not blameworthy for harming another person.
Consent may be divided into three, overlapping types: hypothetical, formal, and
material.62 Hypothetical consent is exemplified by a social contract presumed of
citizens and others whereby certain rights and duties are established.63 Whereas Kant
did not recognize a social contract based on hypothetical consent,64 various Kantians,
such as Rawls, have done so.65 Second, formal consent occurs when a person
manifests consent by choosing to assume duties or forgo rights under conditions of
partial ignorance or coercion.66 For example, a person who enters an enforceable
contract formally consents to unread terms and legal contract rules that one knows or
has reason to know. Third, material consent, at its polar limit, involves an ideally
rational choice of a fully autonomous person.67 Such consent is completely free of
ignorance and coercion.68
In light of deontic principles and these three types of consent, I favor a Consent
Principle. This Principle declares that the degree or depth of the consent necessary to
adjust an agent’s baseline autonomy space turns on the extent to which the
adjustment impacts the agent’s autonomy space.69 The greater the reduction of the
agent’s autonomy space, the deeper, freer from ignorance and coercion, her consent
must be.70 For example, consent to sexual relations must be stronger, more informed,
and freer from coercion, than consent to a kiss and, even less demanding, consent to
60

See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 112
(5th ed. 1984) (Consent “is not, strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, but goes to
negative the existence of any tort in the first instance.”).
61

“Once the victim consents [to a harm or an act risking a harm], there is no [legal]
interest to protect; the victim has in effect conveyed his right to legal protection from the
actor, at least for some duration.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 55, at 276; see also
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 182 (1986); STEVENS, supra note 41, at 17
(“[T]he waiver of the primary [first-order] right means that there is no right to violate, and
consequently no wrong.”).
62

These are not to be confused with hypothetical, formal, and material autonomy space.
See Kuklin, supra note 1, at 408-14 (“Types of Autonomy Space”).
63

Id.

64

For a brief account of why Kant resorted to an imaginary contract, not a consensual
one, see SANDEL, supra note 2, at 142.
65

See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).

66

These two elements invoke Aristotle’s requisites for responsible conduct, discussed
supra at notes 26-27.
67

Kuklin, supra note 1, at 446-47.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 394 n.63.

70

Id. at 395-99.
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a hug. Likewise, declining a valuable gift requires deeper consent than forgoing a
nominal one. Consent, of sorts, is also requisite to the adoption of maxims, which
give rise to rights and duties.71 This consent similarly falls within the Consent
Principle. For instance, adoption of a maxim necessitating arduous rescues of
strangers requires richer consent than one demanding the expression of gratitude for
being rescued.
III. REQUITALS FOR AUTONOMY INVASIONS
Requitals apply second-order maxims to rectify violations of adopted first-order,
substantive maxims. Together, these satisfy requirements of justice. A general form
of justice is: “To each according to X, from each according to Y.”72 X and Y are
commonly called “desert,” though some notions of X and Y stretch the ordinary
meaning of this label.73
There are various conceptions of X, that is, of what one should receive.
Corrective justice provides some of the conceptions.74 For example, two conceptions
of corrective justice (one of them encompassing the bracketed term) are: “To each
according to wrongful harm [from blameworthiness].”75 Some of these conceptions
71

In the context of maxims, terms more descriptive than “consent” may be “adoption,”
“sanction,” “acceptance,” or “approval.”
72
The commentators generally focus on the X, “to”, side of the equation. See, e.g., CH.
PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 6-29 (1963); Diana T.
Meyers, Introduction, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES
1-2 (Kenneth Kipnis & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1985); Serena Olsaretti, Introduction: Debating
Desert and Justice, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 1 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003).
73
In Feinberg’s classic exposition, desert judgments have the form: “‘S deserves X in
virtue of F,’ where S is a person, X a mode of treatment, and F some fact about S . . . .” JOEL
FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING 55, 61 (1970).
74

“The test of adequacy [for principles of formalism] is satisfied when the justification
for a doctrine conforms to the structure of corrective justice. More than one doctrine
concerning a given point may satisfy this test.” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 228 (citation
omitted).
75
As is the case elsewhere, I bracket certain terms to indicate various conceptions of the
maxim under consideration. Here there are two identified conceptions of X, one that does not
require blameworthiness and the other that does. Another of numerous possibilities for the
brackets involves the nature of the ensuing harms. For example, a particular requital maxim
may allow recoveries for physical and psychic harms, but not [purely] economic ones.
Goldberg suggests that the second conception of corrective justice, which accounts for
the blameworthiness of the invader, is the only acceptable one. After discussing the injustice
of the “thin skull” rule, he concludes, “In short, to the extent that tort law is driven by
considerations of corrective justice, damages for intentional and negligent torts arguably
should be determined not by the full compensation principle, but by an independent inquiry
into the nature and gravity of the defendant’s wrongdoing.” John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct,
Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2041
(1997) [hereinafter Goldberg, Misconduct] (citation omitted). Goldberg finds that the shift
from fair compensation for tortious invasions, which accounts for the invader’s
blameworthiness, and full compensation, which does not, took place in the mid-nineteenth
century. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006). “Blameworthiness of conduct and protected
interests are the two types of props which, when combined, will make up the ‘grid’ of tort
law.” Eric Descheemaeker, Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence, 29 OXFORD J.
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are discussed below. Other conceptions of X are grounded in distributive justice. As
Aristotle would have it, distributive justice “is manifested in distributions of honour
or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in
the constitution . . . .”76 Today, matters of distributive justice are seen as including
the distributive effects of norms, legal and otherwise. Retribution, under the view I
embrace,77 falls within distributive justice.78 Other moral systems, such as
utilitarianism and perhaps virtue ethics, advance other conceptions of X.79
Commentators have also championed various conceptions of Y, what a person is
to give, in the general formula for justice. Under corrective justice and, perhaps,
retribution, two conceptions of Y are: “From each according to the extent of the
caused [wrongful] harm.” For distributive justice, two conceptions, arguably
grounding retribution, are: “From each according to [in proportion to] (negative)
desert.” Another two are: “From each according to wealth [societal benefits].”80
Other moral foundations, such as utilitarianism, ground comparable conceptions of
Y.81
Corrective justice is the chief deontic principle for privately requiting autonomy
invasions. Ernest Weinrib, for example, is a leader among those who examine

LEGAL STUD. 603, 603 (2009). Finkelstein disagrees. See Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevance
of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REV. 335, 335
(1996). Unlike criminal law, she sees tort law, “at least at present,” as social welfarist, having
“nothing to do with culpability.” Id. at 345.
76

ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1005-06.

77

While both corrective justice and retribution are key concepts in delineating autonomy
space, this Article emphasizes corrective justice more than retribution because this latter
concept gets most of the attention in my working paper entitled “Public Requitals: Corrective
Justice, Retribution, and Distributive Justice.”
78

See, e.g., C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 5 (1987); Wojciech Sadurski,
Distributive Justice and the Theory of Punishment, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 47 (1985).
79
Under Bentham’s hedonistic version of utilitarianism, the X would be something like
this: “To each according to the extent that overall happiness is promoted.” See generally
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789).
“Virtue ethics . . . may, initially, be identified as the [major approach to normative
ethics] that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which
emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions
(consequentialism).” Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/ (last visited May 8, 2016).
Plato, a founder of virtue ethics, identifies justice or fairness as one of the primary virtues. See
4 PLATO, PROTAGORAS 123, 162-65 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., n.d.). Aristotle, another
champion of virtue ethics, similarly specified justice as one of “[t]he forms of Virtue.” See
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1317, 1354.
80
The wealth gauge is known as “deep pocket” in tort law or horizontal equity in taxation
law. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 64, 76-77 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010); David Elkins, Horizontal
Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43 (2006).
81

For utilitarianism, one conception is: “From each insofar as it increases overall social
utility.”
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private law and see Kant and corrective justice as immanent in it.82 But the meaning
or definition of corrective justice is not settled.83 A variety of plausible conceptions
are considered below.84
Although the conceptions of corrective justice discussed here not exhaustive,
there are two key elements in most notions of X involved: wrongful harm and
blameworthiness.85 The same is true of conceptions of retribution.86 Wrongness and
82

Outlining “the morality latent in the structure of tort law,” Weinrib observes that it was
“first formulated in Aristotle’s discussion of corrective justice and elaborated by Kant . . . .”
Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 403 (1989). See
generally WEINRIB, supra note 27. “Private law makes corrective justice and Kantian right
explicit by actualizing them in doctrines, concepts, and institutions that coherently fit
together.” Id. at 20. “For Kant, as for Aristotle, corrective justice is the justificatory structure
that pertains to the immediate interaction of doer and sufferer.” Id. at 84. For scrutiny,
criticism, and defense of Weinrib’s views, see, for example, Peter Benson, The Basis of
Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 535-47
(1992); Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 235, 254, 274-77
(1996); Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2374-75 (1990).
83
“[D]efinitions of corrective justice differ widely . . . .” Simons, supra note 27, at 871
(distinguishing corrective justice from retributive and distributive justice). For a general
discussion of corrective justice, see Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 40, at 20-33. Walt
identifies at least four different possible purposes for corrective justice. See Steven Walt,
Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2006). Two of them relate to the
distribution of shares. “A third purpose is simply to remedy a wrongful harm. A fourth
possibility might operate in tort law. Here, the duty of repair arises upon the violation of legal
entitlements, whether or not the entitlements are morally legitimate.” Id. “Depending on the
particular purpose identified, the duty of repair may be one of either corrective or distributive
justice.” Id.
“Th[e] rectification [function of corrective justice] operates correlatively on both
parties. The central feature of a system of liability is that any liability of a particular defendant
is simultaneously a liability to a particular plaintiff.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
16 (2012).

To leave those costs [“from the actualization of a {inappropriate} risk”] where they
fall would be to allow one person to set the terms of their interactions with others
unilaterally, for it would be to allow injurers to pursue their ends at the expense of
others. Alternatively, to hold them in common would be unjust in a different way, for
it would be to allow one person to demand extra resources from the state so as to spare
him the costs of looking out for the security of others. Thus, the law of private
damages is required in order to guarantee a regime of equal freedom.
Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 L. & PHIL. 751, 762
(2000).
84
I plan to add to these plausible conceptions and take up the issue of proper requitals,
i.e., the Y in the formula of justice, in my future Article “Public Requitals: Corrective Justice,
Retribution, and Distributive Justice.”
85
In each of these conceptions of corrective justice, harm plays a central role, but
Ripstein identifies torts that are not harm-based: “[A] fault element is a familiar feature of
harm-based torts, but never a feature of trespass-based torts. (Confusion about this leads some
to suppose that ‘intentional’ names a culpable mental state, more serious than negligence.) . . .
Harm-based torts occur when separate persons pursue their separate purposes.” Arthur
Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1 J. TORT L. 3, 16 (2007). “Trespass-based torts have no
fault element. Each person has a protected liberty interest in using his or her means in ways
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blameworthiness are distinct notions.87 Wrongful harm, established by the violation
of a first-order, substantive maxim designed to proscribe certain types or sources of
harms, is identified above; whereas harm from negligence may be proscribed when
harm from an “inevitable accident” is not. Justifications for harmful conduct are
often said to be denials of wrongness.88 An agent’s blameworthiness, or culpability,89
I contend, largely relates to the disrespectfulness towards an invadee reflected in the
agent’s conduct (action or inaction).90 Maxims may include blameworthiness as a
threshold standard (e.g., negligence) or as a factor that increases or decreases the
invader’s obligatory requital (e.g., some intentional torts, retribution), as seen in
what follows.
“When one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to
compensate that person [the state] to the extent of the [wrongful] harm.” “The state”
is bracketed for use of the formula for criminal punishment, in which case the state is
in some way “compensated” by fine or otherwise.91 In the criminal context, perhaps
another word, such as “repay,” “restore,” or “restitute,” captures more of the idea,
that generally do not interfere with the ability of others to do the same, but nobody has a
protected liberty interest in using means that belong to another.” Id. at 18. I would argue that
Ripstein’s trespass-based torts do have a fault element, weak at times, and are harmful to the
invadee. They are wrongful dignitary harms. Referring to the first quote, one might also find
that one of the trespassed landowner’s purposes is to exclude trespassers.
86
“[There] is the deeply entrenched notion that the measure [of retributive punishment]
should not be, or not only be, the subjective wickedness of the offender but the amount of
harm done.” H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234 (1968). Moore discusses the
need for a moral theory to justify “when someone deserves to be punished . . . . On the moral
theory I think to be most plausible, moral desert is built on two moral properties, wrongdoing
and culpability.” Michael S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions,
and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 234 (Winter
2012) (footnote omitted).
87
“[W]rongness and blame can come apart. The blameworthiness of an action depends, in
ways that wrongness generally does not, on the reasons for which a person acted and the
conditions under which he or she did so.” T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS:
PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 124 (2008). “[A]ny adequate statement of the necessary or
sufficient conditions for being blameworthy will have to make essential reference to acts that
are wrong. At least to this extent, I take the concept of wrongness to be prior to that of
blameworthiness.” GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 9 n.7 (2006) (noting that Gibbard
“reverses this ordering” in ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE FEELINGS, APT CHOICES 40-45 (1990)). The
reactions to blame include anger and other negative feelings, hostile behavior, reproach, and,
for self-blame, apology. Id. at 94-95. For Sher’s formulation of blameworthiness, see id. at
132-33.
88

See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 85 (1998).

89

While “blameworthiness” and “culpability” have been distinguished, see, for example,
Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal
Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 367 (1994). For my purposes a distinction is
not important, so I discuss them together.
90

See Bailey Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming

2016).
91

The state, not being a moral person, cannot be “compensated” in the way that moral
persons can be.
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though still imperfectly. If we think of the state not as an independent, collective
entity, but rather as a representative for requiting harms to individual citizens, the
terms become more satisfactory.
“When one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to
compensate that person [the state] to the extent of the [wrongful] harm and
blameworthiness.” In these versions, blameworthiness comes in twice, first, as a
threshold standard to determine whether the wrongful harm is compensable or
deserving of retribution, and second, as a factor in the measure of the requital.
“When one wrongfully harms another person, she is to compensate that person to
the extent of the [wrongful] harm.” This, under one interpretation, is strict liability.92
Under Richard Epstein’s conception, “you did it, you pay.”93 Strict liability still
requires the harm to be wrongful. Some harms are not requitable, such as most
stemming from inaction or under the doctrine, “live and let live.”94 This version of
corrective justice is often associated with libertarianism.95
92
“Four varieties of strict legal liability can be distinguished, which I will call passive
strict liability, right-based strict liability, activity-based strict liability and outcome-based
strict liability.” PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 82 (2002); see id. at 8284. One may wish to adopt different maxims for each of the four varieties.
93
By “you did it,” Epstein means, paradigmatically, wrongful harms from force, fright,
compulsion, and creation of dangerous conditions. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973). Some commentators ask, why these
paradigms and not others? See Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J.
2579, 2598 (1995) [hereinafter Coleman, Legal Theory]; Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein,
Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 106-07 (1995); Stephen R. Perry, The
Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 147 (1988) [hereinafter Perry,
Impossibility]. For further criticism, see, for example, MOORE, supra note 56, at 357-58, 361;
Stephen R. Perry, The Distributive Turn: Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Theory, in
ANALYZING LAW 141, 148 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); Coleman, Legal Theory, supra, at 2614-17;
Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 55-63 (1980).
94

See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (1862); Richard Epstein,
Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?,,1
ENVTL. L. & PROP. RTS. PRAC. GROUP NEWSL., no. 2, May 1997, http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/transaction-costs-and-property-rights-or-do-good-fences-makegood-neighbors. “Some level of risk is simply the price of freedom to act, and that level of
risk is the background level . . . . Because these risks are the price of ordinary activity, we are
all better off bearing them than attempting to reduce them.” Keating, supra note 31, at 45.
95
See Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 93, at 91. Notice a certain irony in the libertarian
adoption of this conception: the various understandings of wrongful harms and corrective
justice identified here produce differing tradeoffs between the protection of a person’s liberty
and security interests. By embracing a strict liability standard for particular impacts, this
version of corrective justice favors security over liberty. Perhaps these libertarians should be
relabeled “securitarians.” Locke, for example, seemingly falls within this camp. See JOHN
LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, 412-13
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690) (“Men enter into Society . . . [and authorize laws] to limit the
Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the society . . . . [T]he
people . . . provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in
Society.”). For similar emphasis of security over liberty, see, for example, 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *119 (1768); JOHN STUART MILL,
Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 67 (J.M.
Dent & Sons 1910) (1st ed. London 1863); see also Kuklin, supra note 1, at 387 n.31.
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In the conceptions of corrective justice displayed above, harms are lumped
together, but justifiable conceptions may vary according to the particular types of
harms in question. Here are some examples.
“When one physically, economically, or psychically harms another person
wrongfully by blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate that person to the extent
of the harm [and blameworthiness].” This would exclude dignitary harm from
ordinary tort recoveries but, as stated, would allow recovery for pure economic loss
alone. To elaborate on the bracketed permutation of this maxim to identify further
examples, the extent of the recovery for psychic harm could depend on the degree of
the blameworthiness (disrespect). For instance, for ordinary negligence the invadee
may recover for the foreseeable psychic harm of a reasonable person, while for
intentional conduct, the invadee may recover for the foreseeable psychic harm of the
actual invadee when greater than that of the reasonable person, and for purposive or
malicious conduct, all the psychic harm is remediable, foreseeable or not.96
“When one wrongfully harms another person’s dignity, she is to compensate that
person to the extent of the harm and her blameworthiness.” This suggests that pure
dignitary harm recoveries take into account the reduced or increased
blameworthiness of the invader, unlike ordinary tort damages for other types of
harms. An unforeseeable trespass to realty, for instance, as where one reasonably
believes the property is her own, allows for nominal damages, while knowing
trespass allows for more damages even in the absence of other harms.
“When one wrongfully, economically harms another person by exacerbated
[purposive, knowledgeable, reckless, intentional] blameworthy conduct, she is to
compensate that person to the extent of the harm.” Like the pure economic loss
doctrine in torts,97 this conception would allow for such recoveries when the actor’s
96
One view is “that those who intentionally cause harm should be liable for more remote
consequences than those who negligently cause harm. This seems to be the position today in
the law of torts.” GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 370 (1978). This view has
been advanced for contract damages as well. See Note, The Inadequacy of Hadley v.
Baxendale as a Rule for Determining Legal Cause, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 802 (1965).
The subjective nature of psychic harm is troublesome. “Many are wary of giving
highly idiosyncratic victims’ preferences too much weight, mainly because they worry about
abuse. Others think it’s just plain arbitrary to ignore the victim’s feelings.” Leo Katz, A Look
at Tort Law with Criminal Law Blinders, 76 B.U. L. REV. 307, 315 (1996). For criminal law
matters, Katz favors “the objective view of injuries.” Id. Monetary compensation for psychic
harms may be, in principle, problematic. “[I]ntangible losses and monetary damages are
simply incommensurable. The real difficulty with damage awards for intangible loss is that
they purport to be compensatory when in reality they are not.” Steven D. Smith, The Critics
and the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
765, 770 (1987) (citations omitted). “The impossibility of precisely quantifying intangible
injuries does not mean that awards for such injuries are necessarily illegitimate. Instead, the
dispute resolution conception of tort remedies suggests that damage awards express societal
recognition of the gravity of the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 788.
97

See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1115 (2000) (“Broadly speaking, the
plaintiff who claims a stand-alone commercial or economic tort must usually (but not
invariably) prove intent rather than negligence.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 606 (1999)
(“The general legal position today denies recovery to P for pure economic loss as a result of
D’s negligence.”). There has been a major controversy in tort law over “the extent to which
the law should exclude protection for pure economic loss.” GORDLEY, supra note 27, at 217.
See generally id. at 263-84 (“Liability in Tort for Pure Economic Loss”). Gordley discusses
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blameworthiness (disrespect) is heightened beyond ordinary negligence, but not
otherwise. In these cases, there likely are substantial dignitary harms as well as
economic ones.
Beyond these identified permutations, different conceptions of corrective justice,
or different wrongful harms subject to requitals, may use different standards of
causation, both cause in fact and proximate cause. The element of cause in fact for
psychic harm may be based on, say, a “but for” standard, while for physical harm,
“substantial factor.”98
In general, there is a wide range of conceptions of corrective justice and
retribution that may be adopted by an individual or the state on behalf of individuals
to coordinate their behavior.99 So long as a second-order, requital maxim satisfies the
categorical imperative,100 whether or not to adopt it is a matter of preference and
the difficulty with implementing an economic loss doctrine as a rationale for limiting it. See
id. at 280-84. Ripstein justifies the existing economic loss doctrine on the grounds “that,
although the possibility of my losing something on which I have come to rely could be the
basis of a norm of conduct, it would place too great a burden on your liberty to be asked to
take account of such things.” Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 656, 683 [hereinafter Ripstein,
Philosophy]. This seems conclusory. Is it too great a burden to take account of the foreseeable
economic consequences of your negligent conduct? Is it less of a burden on the person whose
security interest is truncated by such negligent conduct? Risk avoidance and other policy
considerations also obtain. Ripstein asserts that an appropriate balance cannot be struck. See
id. at 685; Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957,
1977 (2007) (after noting the floodgates argument, making the conclusory point, “There is no
liability in negligence for pure economic loss because the plaintiff has no proprietary right to
the economic interest that was injured.”). One commentator, puzzled that pure economic loss
is non-recoverable, notes that “courts have of late made a number of exceptions to the
economic loss rule and it is harder than it once was to say what exactly the rule is.” Henry E.
Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L. 5, 26 (2011) (citation
omitted). See generally Gennady A. Gorel, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for
the Intermediate Rule and Taming the Tort-Eating Monster, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (2006).
98

For causation in fact, see generally DOBBS, supra note 97, at 405-18; PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 60, at 263-72.
99

“[L]aw promises coordination in any enterprise it undertakes, whether that is
substantive justice or the maximization of well-being . . . . [P]rincipled consistency is
normatively indispensable in the forcible pursuit of substantive justice.” Jeremy Waldron,
Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 787 (2001). Turning the choice of the
version of corrective justice over to individuals “mak[es] each person’s security depend on the
particular priorities of his or her injurer. Those difficulties would be doubled because each
person’s liberty would depend on the particular sensibilities of his or her potential victims.”
Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 93, at 109. In the context of negligence and elsewhere,
existing law solves this indeterminacy problem by looking to the reasonable person standard,
custom, and convention. See id. at 112. But still, the individual can ask, “why should I be held
to such a standard. I did not consent to it.” Thus the beast of political obligation once again
raises its formidable head. Yet, because the law must hone sometimes nebulous general moral
principles, “[t]he effect of legal determinations of moral principle is often to make them
obligatory as part of morality, quite apart from any general presumption there may be in
favour of a moral duty to obey the law.” TONY HONORE, Introduction, in RESPONSIBILITY AND
FAULT, supra note 27, at 1, 8.
100
“Kant’s insight is that just as primary rights to freedom must be subject to reciprocal
limits, so too must secondary rights to enforcement.” Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and
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judgment reflecting, among other things, relative weights or valuations given to the
various aspects of liberty, security, wrongness, and blameworthiness.101 As seen in
the proffered examples, an agent may adopt many, diverse conceptions of corrective
justice,102 to say nothing of retribution, each one depending on the substantive
maxim in issue and the particularities of the circumstances. She may choose one
conception for intentional harms, another for negligent harms, another for
abnormally dangerous activities, others depending on the types of harms, and so
forth.
IV. COMMON AUTONOMY SPACE BOUNDARY MARKERS
There is an interrelationship between first- and second-order maxims; that is,
between substantive maxims directly establishing autonomy space boundaries and
applicable maxims that specify requitals for particular autonomy space incursions.
For example, suppose one adopts a first-order maxim that declares, “do not harm
another person.” This is inordinately demanding, implicitly proscribing an ordinary,
inadvertent bumping into another person in a crowd, or economic loss to another
from fair business practices, or even psychic harm to another from envy of the
agent’s legitimate success. Then, as a requital for this substantive maxim pursuant to
corrective justice, assume one adopts a second-order maxim that states, “when one
{wrongfully} harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate
that person to the extent of the {wrongful} harm.”103 The strictness of the substantive
maxim is thus ameliorated by this associated conception of corrective justice.
Requital under it requires the harm to ensue from blameworthy conduct, which,
presumably, would not reach the implicit, quotidian harms mentioned. Inadvertent
bumping in a crowd is not disrespectful, not blameworthy. Significant harm from
such contact is not foreseeable, not blameworthy. In identifying an agent’s baseline
autonomy space, both the relevant substantive maxims and associated requital
maxims must be integrated.
First-order, substantive maxims must cohere with associated second-order,
requital maxims. Consider these first- and second-order maxims: “Do not purposely
produce an unreasonable risk of harming another person”; “when one wrongfully
harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate that person to
the extent of the wrongful harm.” In this substantive maxim, the implications of
“purposely produce an unreasonable risk” have overtones of disrespect
blameworthiness. If one purposely intends to produce such a risk, one tacitly
disrespects the dignity of the person put at risk. One is dismissive. One chooses, or is
willing to use the person, as a means only. In light of this interpretation, the secondPublic Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1418 (2006). “[E]nforcement must be
done in a way that is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws.” Id.
101
Coleman and Ripstein refer to “substantive judgements about why various activities
matter to us and about the ways in which they do.” Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 93, at
109.
102

“[W]hile corrective justice may morally require that individual agents (and perhaps
even the state) do something about the wrongs they do to others, it need not specify precisely
what should be done.” WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 414 (2007).
103

Under the given substantive maxim, all harms are wrongful, thus the curly bracketing
of “wrongful.”
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order maxim, “when one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct
. . .” does not fit neatly with the given first-order maxim. The wrongful harm
(“purposely produc[ing] an unreasonable risk”) already implies blameworthiness.
The requital maxim when combined with substantive maxim comes down to, “when
one is blameworthy in causing a harm to another person by blameworthy conduct . . .
.”104
One may resolve this type of overlap between the first- and second-order maxims
by modifying one or both of them. One plausible way is: “Do not purposely produce
an unreasonable risk of harming another person,” or “when one wrongfully harms
another person [deleted: “by blameworthy conduct”], she is to compensate that
person to the extent of the wrongful harm.” Another plausible way is: “Do not
[deleted: “purposely”] produce an unreasonable risk of harming another person,” or
“when one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to
compensate that person to the extent of the wrongful harm.”
Yet something can be said for accommodating potential overlaps in the thrust of
substantive maxims and associated requital maxims. In addressing particular harms
in distinct circumstances, overlaps may be difficult to avoid without tortuously
explicit maxims. Overlaps may also provide flexibility for the application of maxims
to questionable conduct impossible or impractical to fully anticipate or specify
beforehand. Consider these changes to the substantive maxim above. Instead of,
“purposely produce an unreasonable risk . . . ,” the weaker mental state
“intentionally produce an unreasonable risk . . . ,” or, weaker still, “foreseeably
produce an unreasonable risk . . . ,” may still connote disrespect and responsibility
blameworthiness, to some extent, depending on the circumstances.105 Degrees of
104

The other prong of blameworthiness, responsibility (lack of ignorance and coercion),
remains in place.
105
Regarding “intention,” Prosser notes that, for intentional torts today, “it is a state of
mind . . . about consequences of an act (or omission) and not about the act itself.” PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 60, at 34. Under this, intentionally stepping onto property which one
reasonably but mistakenly believes is one’s own is still a trespass, though the
blameworthiness, both disrespect and responsibility, may be minimal. Nonetheless, we still
may wish to symbolically protect the dignitary interest of such a harmed party, as by granting
nominal damages for trespass to realty causing no economic damage. Dignitary harms turn on
objective manifestations of disrespect as well as subjective mental states. Impermissibly
stepping on another’s property may manifest disrespect of her and her property claims,
depending on the situation and relevant social norms. Agents are on notice of the strictness of
trespass doctrine. They thus can foresee in a weak sense their potential liability for their
conduct. See infra note 106. Fletcher would partially protect the “innocent” trespasser. After
noting that the excuse of unavoidable ignorance does not defeat some intentional torts, such as
trespass to land, he argues that when the plaintiff seeks damages, and is not simply testing the
title to the land, the excuses of “compulsion and unavoidable ignorance . . . transcend
doctrinal barriers and apply in all cases of nonreciprocal risk-taking.” George P. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 556 (1972).
Regarding “foreseeability”, it also may not imply disrespectfulness in any substantial or
significant sense, as where statistical lives are foreseeably put at risk in a large construction
project. Especially this is true when those at risk knowingly consent to assuming it. According
to Aquinas, if not before, “[t]here is a distinction between what we intend and what we
foresee.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 690-91 (referring to the doctrine of double effect).
“Responsibility for one’s actions’ side-effects – foreseen or foreseeable – is morally and
humanly different in kind from responsibility for what one intends, and therefore ought to be
regarded as a distinct kind of basis for tortious liability.” John Finnis, Natural Law: The
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disrespect are suggested by these maxims. To come at this point from a different
direction, when an agent’s conduct is described in these ways; (1) “she put him at an
unreasonable risk . . .,” (2) “she foreseeably put him at an unreasonable risk . . .,” (3)
“she intentionally put him at an unreasonable risk,” or finally, (4) “she purposely put
him at unreasonable risk,” we think, without knowing more, that the agent’s
blameworthiness increases with each revised description. The meanings of each of
these key terms, “unreasonable,” “foreseeable,” “intention,” and “purpose,” have
much penumbra around the cores.106 Overlaps in terminology and meanings of the
first- and second-order maxims may be resolved in practice by applying different
penumbral connotations of the terms, one for the substantive maxim and another for
the requital maxim. This disappoints our preference to provide unambiguous notice
to agents of the reach of the maxims they must satisfy,107 yet we have come to live
with this problem daily. We often establish legal standards (“act reasonably”) rather
than rules (“do not do x, y, or z”). At times, flexibility is deemed more important
than high predictability.
One pronounced reason for overlaps between substantive and requital maxims is
that both maxims typically include the notion of foreseeability either implicitly or
explicitly. Under existing tort law, the substantive negligence maxim (in a nutshell,
“act reasonably”) implies foreseeability, and the requital maxim, corrective justice,
usually does too.108 Foreseeability is often, if not always, an aspect of all four or five
elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation (cause in fact and proximate cause),
and damages.109 Observing that, “[f]oreseeability is undoubtedly a muddle in the law
Classical Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
supra note 56, at 1, 46. But the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that those who act
with knowledge are equally responsible as those who act with intent. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
106

For example, Moore sees the “conceptual problem with foreseeability” as stemming
from “the ambiguity in what is meant by ‘foreseeable’ . . . , the obvious vagueness of the term
. . . , [and, more seriously,] “the multiple description problem.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 36364. For the latter problem, see infra note 189. “I thus conclude that the criminal and tort law
conceptions of proximate causation in terms of foreseeability are completely indeterminate in
all cases.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 395. But, Moore explains, this is not the case “as that
concept is used as part of what is meant by negligence . . . .” Id. at 398.
107
“The values served by the virtue of predictability are liberty (because more accurate
planning is possible) and fairness (because surprise is reduced).” MOORE, supra note 56, at 11.
There are limits to the acceptable shortfall in predictability. To provide adequate notice, under
the legality principle “no one can be criminally punished if the crime of which he is guilty has
not been enacted by statute . . . .” Larry Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 815, 823.
See generally FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 206-14 (“Justice versus Legality”).
108

See generally David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277
(2009). To slide down the slippery slope, “all persons understand, at some level, that
consequences outside the realm of their expectations sometimes do occur, and so at some level
of abstract understanding they ‘foresee’ the possibility of such unexpected results.” Id. at
1288.
109
“Among the five elements of which negligence is comprised [separating out proximate
cause and cause in fact], most scholars agree that foreseeability is implicated in three: duty,
breach, and proximate cause.” Owen, id. at 1290 (footnoting the role of foreseeability in the
remaining two, factual causation and damages). In contracts, foreseeability plays a strong role.
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of negligence,”110 Benjamin Zipursky, after examining the role of foreseeability in
duty, breach, and proximate cause, concludes, “foreseeability does not play a single
role within negligence law, but a complex variety of connected roles.”111 In
principle, one could avoid the overlap of foreseeability by narrowly specifying,
based on its particular contextual role, its meaning and confining each use to one or
the other of the first- and second-order maxims, or to a single element of a maxim.112
But it would often significantly undercut our established norms to unduly restrict the
important role of foreseeability. Nonetheless, legal doctrines challenging the
ubiquity of foreseeability requirements include the “thin skull” doctrine,113
All recoverable contract damages must be reasonably foreseeable to the breacher at the time
of entering into the contract. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981). “Although the [contract foreseeability]
requirement neither demands absolute clairvoyance nor admits of vague premonition, it leaves
considerable latitude between these extremes.” E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1204 (1970).
Criminal law need not be left out of this examination of foreseeability. By way of
prelude, criminal liability also requires both cause in fact and proximate cause. See DUBBER,
supra note 58, at 128-29. In the criminal law, “[p]roximate causation, typically formulated as
either a question of foreseeability or harm within the risk, limits the reach of causation in
fact.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Unsolved Mysteries of Causation and Responsibility, 42
RUTGERS L.J. 347, 349 (2011). “Much has been written either asserting or denying that the
conceptions of proximate causation used in torts and criminal law are the same.” MOORE,
supra note 56, at 363 n.1 (referring to the role of foreseeability in the tests of proximate
causation).
110

Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many Faces of Foreseeability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
156, 156 (2000). The same can be said of proximate cause in general. See Heidi M. Hurd &
Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 333, 336 (2002) (“It is
well known that the tests for proximate causation in Anglo-American tort law and criminal
law are elusive, multiple, and often conflicting in their implications for cases.”). Under the
view that the tests of proximate cause “ask the wrong question . . . [,] the central problem the
proximate cause tests address is the problem of lack of fit between what defendant intended,
foresaw, or risked, on the one hand, and what defendant caused in fact, on the other.” Id. at
336-37. “The issue, on this view, has nothing to do with causation but, rather, with
culpability.” Id. at 337. “A defendant is culpable for an unjustified harm if he positively
intended to cause the harm, knew that it would happen, was consciously aware of a risk that it
would happen, or should have been consciously aware of a risk that it would happen.” Id. at
385.
111

Zipursky, supra note 110, at 158; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in
Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247 (2009) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach]. “Foreseeability is the great paradox of tort: one of its
most vital moral tethers, yet irretrievably its most elusive.” Owen, supra note 108, at 1277.
“[W]hile foreseeability may be the fundamental moral glue of tort, it provides so little
decisional guidance that scholars often revile it for being vague, vacuous, and indeterminate . .
. .” Id. at 1278.
112

In negligence, for instance, the main liability limiting function of foreseeability can be
(largely) satisfied through any one of its elements. For example, compare Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from N.S.W.) (U.K.), with Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928).
113
See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 97, at 464-65; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 296.
A case can be make that the “thin skull” doctrine is contrary to deontic justice, embraced for
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probabilistic causation (lost chance),114 market share liability,115 and strict products
liability.116
Notice that the elements of negligence as usually understood imply both firstand second-order maxims. Putting the negligence standard this way, “[w]hen one
wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, one is to compensate her
to the extent of the harm,” the duty element points to a substantive, first-order
maxim (“[d]o not wrongfully harm another person”). This does not point
unambiguously, because “wrongful harm” needs further specification. “An
unreasonable risk of harm” commonly specifies a “wrongful harm” in the negligence
context. The negligence standard can then be elaborated this way: “When one
imposes an unreasonable risk of harm on another person by blameworthy conduct,
one is to compensate her to the extent of the harm.” Under this articulation, the
implicit breach, causation, and damages elements point to a particular requital,
second-order maxim.117
In sum, depending on the first-order maxims directly marking autonomy space
boundaries, conceptions of corrective justice as implemented in second-order,
requital maxims may be substantial, if indirect, determinants of these boundaries as
well. How much of the work in establishing boundary markers is done by each of the
associated maxims is a matter of convenience, values, and judgment. A parallel case
can be made in the context of retributive punishment for criminal conduct.

other reasons, such as risk avoidance, loss spreading, “two innocents” doctrine, cost
internalization, etc. “The gap between full compensation and just compensation appears most
clearly in negligence law’s embrace of the ‘thin skull’ rule.” Goldberg, Misconduct, supra
note 75, at 97 (footnote omitted). See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing
Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1563, 1581 (2006). Ripstein objects. “[T]he eggshell plaintiff . . . recovers because she
has been wronged; the extent of the injury determines the extent of the wrong, and so, too, of
the remedy.” Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 196 (2011). Wronged, yes, but the extent of the wrong (injury), I
would have it, is up for grabs. Within a plausible range, it is for the law to determine, with
justification. Moreover, the “thin skull” doctrine is supportable deontically by a requital
maxim that if one can foresee some harm of a particular type, then one is liable for
unforeseeable, more extensive harm of that type. While the foreseeability is attenuated, there
is some degree of foreseeability. At times one may formally consent to liability for
unforeseeable harms. If one chooses to engage in conduct about which one has reason to know
are obligatory maxims proscribing unforeseeable harms, one has consented in some measure
to liability for unforeseeable harms. See infra note 189. In the end, “[t]he examples just
enumerated [e.g., “the thin-skull rule”] suggest, and many commentators on the subject have
come to accept, that the legal concept of proximate causation is not a single moral principle
but rather a grab bag of differing normative considerations.” Perry, Responsibility for
Outcomes, supra note 27, at 96.
114

See DOBBS, supra note 97, at 430-32; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 272.

115

See DOBBS, supra note 97, at 436-38; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 271-72,
713-14; Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 27, at 96 (adding respondeat superior
to the list).
116

See DOBBS, supra note 97, at 972-77; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 690-94.

117

The causation element can also be seen as an aspect of the first-order, substantive
maxim. Whether one has harmed another person entails the question of causation.
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A. First-Order, Substantive Maxims
Thus far, I have emphasized the role of second-order, requital maxims in the
effective, indirect construction of an agent’s autonomy space. This section examines
a panoply of primarily first-order, substantive maxims that directly delineate
boundaries. In the jurisprudential literature over the years, this consumes most of the
ink. In any case, the interconnections and overlaps between substantive and
complementary requital maxims blur their distinction. When considering plausible
maxims for adoption, I stress the centrality of the balance between liberty and
security interests while meeting the constraints of the categorical imperative. Judging
the balance in conflicting interests highlights two or three ideas: (1) the liberty to
make choices to engage in conduct (action or inaction); (2) the security from impacts
by the actions of others; and; (3) concomitantly, the freedom from being used as a
means only to another’s ends. The third idea encompasses the freedom from various
forms of disrespect by others. While this dignitary “freedom from” may be seen as a
facet of one’s general security interest, it is discussed separately because of its
prominence as a trail signpost in the following discussion.
In the proceeding parts, I consider situations in which the liberty and security
interests of people may conflict. I then identify and discuss some plausible maxims
designed to demarcate relevant autonomy space boundaries, keeping in mind the
demands of mutual respect.
1. Intentional, Harmful Conduct
The categorical imperative suggests that intentional acts foreseeably causing
harm to another person are, prima facie, wrongful.118 They seem disrespectful. They
seem invasive of a reasonable person’s security or liberty interests.119 This favors
adoption of the maxim, “do not intentionally harm another person.” But this general
maxim needs significant refinement in light of the complexities of human
interactions, for there are many accepted exceptions, as where one intentionally
makes another person suffer by means of a fair athletic contest. In addition, broad
prima facie maxims often conflict in certain circumstances. There are, ultimately,
numerous exceptions needed to virtually all general maxims, that is, “except when”
or “unless” provisos.120
There is a multitude of plausible deontic maxims relating to intentional acts and
omissions, and also a multitude of justifiable judgments about how to resolve
conflicts among prima facie maxims. The prominent ones, however, have been
sufficiently explored in existing tort, contract, restitution, and criminal law. They
are, therefore, passed over in light of this Article’s aims here. The core of intentional
torts, contract breaches, unjust enrichment,121 and criminal acts generally fit easily
within the constraints of the categorical imperative.122
118

Again, one must be careful not to conflate foreseeability and intention. See supra note

104.
119

For the normative relationship between intention and harm, see generally R.A. Duff,
Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 76 (1989).
120
As noted above, see supra note 13, a maxim may be universal without being extensive.
For a discussion of the deontic difference between universalization and generalization, see
Kuklin, supra note 1, at 421-23.
121
“The law of unjust enrichment, [contrary to tort and contract law,] concerns itself with
reversing certain kinds of non-wrongful transactions on the ground that their non-reversal
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But we must not grant too much deontic inevitability to the existing law
regarding intentional conduct. As an example, here is the standard of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts for Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional
Distress:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm.123
We may begin by asking, why does recovery for psychic harm apparently subsume
recovery for dignitary harm? Why must the intentional or reckless conduct be
severe?124 Does the balance here unduly favor the liberty of the actor over the
security of the victim?125 While the common law of torts may generally be quite
mature, it still has much room to grow (and contract): “The Institute expresses no
opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the actor
may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional
distress.”126
Below I explore some of the more interesting and controversial situations in
which conflicts among the interests of interacting agents may arise. Some of these
involve intentional conduct. I sample tenable, deontic maxims that might be adopted
to resolve the conflicts. This discussion is very general and, at places, quite
speculative.
2. Truth Telling and Promise Keeping
Truth telling and promise keeping are separate concepts, but have enough in
common to be taken together for the purposes of this Article.127 These concepts
would be wrongful.” John Gardner, Corrective Justice, Corrected, 12 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI
PUBBLICHE 9, 32 (2012); see John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
43, 46 (2011).
122

Most fundamental doctrines of battery, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation, contract breach, arson, larceny, etc., are easily enough deontically
justifiable.
123

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).

124

“Because of the fear of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the
difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to liability, the law has been slow to afford
independent protection to the interest in freedom from emotional distress standing alone.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. b (1977). Fair enough, but many other torts are
also subject to these concerns, especially those where psychic harm is likely.
125
The Institute thinks not: “The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities . . . . There must still be
freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.” Id. § 46, cmt. d. There is an
enormous gap between “trivialities” or “harmless steam” and “extreme and outrageous
conduct.”
126

Id. § 46 (Caveat).

127

“A liar and a promise-breaker each use another person. In both speech and promising
there is an invitation to the other to trust, to make himself vulnerable; the liar and the promise-
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might be interrelated.128 Kant made much of maxims relating to these two
concepts,129 some of it fundamental to his exposition of practical reason.130 His

breaker then abuse that trust.” CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 16 (1982). “If the truth
presumption is essential to the well-functioning of rational agents, by-passing it, even for a
good end, would seem to involve the kind of insult to persons’ status as rational agents that
morality prohibits.” Barbara Herman, A Mismatch of Methods, in 2 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS, supra note 29, at 83, 107. One may put cheating in a nearby, intersecting camp.
“[C]heating is related to, and differs from, other morally wrongful acts, such as stealing,
promise-breaking, deceiving, disobedience, and disloyalty.” Stuart P. Green, Cheating, 23
LAW & PHIL. 137, 137 (2004).
128

“G. J. Warnock in Object of Morality argues that the wrong of breaking a promise is
the wrong of not telling the truth. Why ought I to keep my promise? ‘I ought to do it just
because I said I would.’” MARK TUNICK, PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 62 n.40 (1998) (citing G.
J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 101 (1971), and identifying critics, including
Sidgwick and Atiyah)).
129

See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 37, at 74, 80 (promise keeping). “[S]everal
philosophers ground promising in the value of autonomy.” Hanoch Sheinman, Introduction:
Promises and Agreements, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS 3, 22 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011)
(citing Raz, Shiffrin, Robins, and Searle). As for truth telling, “[i]f a declaration made to me is
knowingly false, my freedom is wrongfully restricted.” WOOD, supra note 34, at 243. “If
someone is defrauded in a contract, it is not only this person whose right is violated but the
entire system of contract right, which is structured around the truthfulness of the declarations
involved in contracts.” Id. But Kant, to Parfit’s chagrin, condemns deceit because “any liar
‘violates the dignity of humanity in his own person’ . . . .” 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS 234 (2011) (quoting Kant). “According to [Kant’s] Formula of Humanity, coercion
and deception are the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing to others – the roots of all evil.
Coercion and deception violate the conditions of possible assent . . . .” KORSGAARD, supra
note 35, at 140. “Physical coercion treats someone’s person as a tool; lying treats someone’s
reason as a tool. This is why Kant finds it so horrifying; it is a direct violation of autonomy.”
Id. at 141; see id. at 347-48. “An act of fraud has among its wrong-making features that it
deprives a person of the information he needs to make a rational business decision, and that it
contributes to general uncertainty and therefore enhances transaction costs in the business life
of the community.” Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 44 (1992). At one
place, Kant points in a different direction: “Embezzlement . . . and fraud . . . , when committed
in such a way that the other could detect it, are private crimes. On the other hand,
counterfeiting . . . , theft and robbery, and the like are public crimes, because they endanger
the commonwealth and not just an individual person.” KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra
note 9, at 372-73. But as Wood and Waldron point out above, third parties are also harmed by
embezzlement or fraud.
130

“Kant’s example of a perfect duty to others concerns a promise you might consider
making but have no intention of keeping in order to get needed money.” Robert Johnson,
Kant’s
Moral
Philosophy,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
17,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ (last visited May 8, 2016) (explaining why a
promise-breaking maxim is not workable).
Kant does not ground contract on promise-keeping. “For Kant, a contract is not
understood as a narrow special case of the more general moral obligation of promise keeping,
but as a specifically legal institution through which parties vary their respective rights and
obligations.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 20-21 (citations omitted). For issues over Kant’s
claim for promise-keeping, and the relationship of promise-keeping to contract, see B. Sharon
Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, Kant on “Why Must I Keep My Promise?,” 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
47, 48-53, 71-74 (2006).
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assertions are occasionally notorious.131 He is commonly thought to have been an
absolutist about both.132 But this leaves a wrong impression,133 though his views are,
at times, rather tricky.134 When an unqualified truth telling or promise keeping
maxim has been adopted, Kant insists that it must always be satisfied.135 But these
types of maxims may be properly qualified without violating the categorical
imperative. Qualifications reduce the generality of maxims without inevitably
undermining their universality. Kant made room for such constrained maxims.136 As
131

Kant’s most notorious example of required truth telling was in response to a
hypothetical in which a killer demands to be told by a knowing person where the intended
victim is. The truth must be told! See IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from
Philanthropy, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 9, at 605, 611-15. This is hard to cabin.
The person even seems to be coerced into speaking the truth. For damage control of this
example, see KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 133-58 (“The right to lie: Kant on dealing with
evil”); RIPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 51 n.29; SULLIVAN, supra note 36, at 173-77.
132
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW
& PHIL. 393, 396-97 (2003) (lying).
133
“But [unlike “the supreme principle of morality,”] a secondary moral rule or principle,
whose bindingness on us, when it applies, is categorical, may admit of conditions. For
instance, in the principle that we should keep our promises, there may be implied conditions
that would release us from a promise . . . .” WOOD, supra note 34, at 422.
134

“The right to communicate your thoughts to others is just a special case of the right to
use your powers as you see fit. Kant remarks that this extends even to deliberate falsehoods,
because it is up to others to decide whether to believe what they are told.” RIPSTEIN, supra
note 15, at 51. Leaving it to others to decide whether to believe what they are told when the
speaker knows she is telling a lie strikes me as disrespectful. For a discussion that Kant could
rationalize what seems to be promise-breaking, see SUSAN M. SHELL, KANT AND THE LIMITS OF
AUTONOMY 249 (2009).
135

Regarding “Kant’s conclusion in the case of the argument about false promising, . . .
coercion and deception obviously violate [the categorical imperative Formula of Humanity]
because they achieve their end precisely by frustrating or circumventing another person’s
rational agency and thereby treat the rational nature of the person with obvious disrespect.”
ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 153 (1999).
Kant’s primary example of promise-keeping is where the promisor, at the time of
making the promise, has the entirely self-interested intention, as she perceives it, not to
perform. This is promissory fraud, a simultaneous violation of both truth telling (implicitly, “I
intend to perform”) and promise-keeping. Is the combination multiply worse? What if the
promisor did have the intention to perform, but circumstances later changed making
performance very different from what she expected, indeed, required her to sacrifice other
prima facie duties, such as support of her family?
What if a false assertion is not due to the asserter’s blameworthiness? She had, for
instance, the reasonable, but mistaken belief, in the veracity of the assertion—even all
authorities at the time believed the assertion was truthful. Should the truth telling maxim
include a qualification, such that falsehoods are proscribed only if they are “knowing” or
“intentional”? What about “reckless” or “negligent” falsehoods?
136
Kant accepted common courtesies and prudent reserve in expressing one’s opinions.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 36, at 171-73. “This, then, is what Kant’s view about lying comes
down to: We may never state outright that we will tell the truth when we have no intention of
doing so.” Id. at 173.
Kant’s “catastrophe” limitation suggests qualifications to otherwise apparently
absolute maxims. See WOOD, supra note 34, at 240-55 (pointing out that Kant’s requirement
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a general proposition, a reasonable agent would adopt nearly all, truth telling and
promise keeping maxims with explicit or implicit exceptions.137 Each of the
following maxims, though universalized, differs in the degree or direction of its
generality.
Setting aside negligent failures to tell the truth,138 consider these plausible truth
telling maxims.139 First, to accommodate “white” lies: “Tell the truth except when it
of truth telling is not as strict as thought and allows for lies in emergencies). “The right of
autonomy of individuals is also commonly understood to be qualified by a proviso that
interference is not required to avert a major disaster or to prevent the violation of other, more
stringent rights.”THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, in AUTONOMY AND
SELF-RESPECT, supra note 36, at 25, 34.
Kant also made exceptions for capital punishment for murder, as where nearly the entire
citizenry are accomplices (e.g., a rebellion), maternal infanticide, and soldier dueling. See
KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 475-77.
137

In the context of truth telling, see, for example, Herman, supra note 127, at 106-15.
Particularly censurable are deceptive responses “when (a) the response is a direct lie rather
than a merely evasive, misleading, or deceptively ambiguous response, (b) the person
deceived trusts the deceiver and was encouraged to do so, and (c) the lie concerns the life of
the deceived rather than matters only remotely touching him.” HILL, supra note 136, at 41.
138
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (“Information Negligently
Supplied for the Guidance of Others”). “Deception generally . . . need not be intentional or
voluntary, as lying must.” Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J.
PHIL. 435, 435 (1997). Even though I give you false information, “I can avoid branded a liar
by offering an excuse which denies the ‘mental element’ in lying: that I believed the
information to be true and did not intend to deceive you.” R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY
AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 8 (1990). “There is no universally accepted definition of lying to
others.” James Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and Deception, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. 2, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition (last visited May 8, 2016) (citations
omitted). A “commonly accepted definition . . . is the following: ‘I take a lie to be an
assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the
intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content.’” Id. (citing BERNARD WILLIAMS,
TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 96 (2002)). For objections to the definition, see id. at 10-12.
139
Alexander and Sherwin discuss the meaning and wrong of “lie,” see Alexander &
Sherwin, supra note 132, at 395-99, as well as the broader concept of “deception,” see id. at
400-04. “Leading arguments hold either that lying is wrong in itself or that lying results in
harm that is grave enough to support a near-absolute prohibition.” Id. at 395 (footnote
omitted). “Law prohibits deception in very broad terms.” Id. at 404 (citation omitted). For the
limitations of the law’s prohibitions of deception, see id. at 406-15. Overall, the law does not
“correspond to moral theories that emphasize the effect of deception on the victim’s
autonomy.” Id. at 432. “There is some controversy as to the relative wrongness of various
forms of deception. We can distinguish between a statement (lie) that is technically false and
intended to deceive, a statement that is literally true but is intended to deceive, and a failure to
disclose relevant information.” Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS
OF CONSENT 195, 204 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (finding the moral
differences often exaggerated). Like Wertheimer, “I will [largely] set this issue aside.” Id.
Katz points to “examples in which the manner in which the lie causes the loss quite obviously
is morally relevant.” Katz, supra note 96, at 314; see also id. at 314-15. One commentator
mentions “the common moral judgment that lying is in a way worse than other forms of
deception: the lie is a ‘special affront.’” Collin O’Neil, Lying, Trust, and Gratitude, 40 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 301, 302 (2012). Owens, on the other hand, finds it “doubtful whether being
given a false belief, even a false belief about matter that interests you, is in itself a harm.”
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will be gratuitously hurtful.” For social norms relating to niceties, such as “you look
great” or “your dinner party was scrumptious,” there is typically no expectation of
sincere, literal truth under the circumstances and no real harm from the falsity,
instead there are some benefits. In delineating maxims, consequences must be
weighed. Social norms do not demand or expect truth telling in these situations.140
Quite the contrary. People are trying not to be disrespectful to the listener or subject
of these “white” lies. Surely it would be thought gratuitously disrespectful to hurt the
listener by a truthful, uncomplimentary statement in many social situations. Other
societies may perceive it differently. If we change the circumstances somewhat, even
in our society unvarnished truth is demanded, as where the dinner host is relying on
the evaluation of the food served for purposes of opening a restaurant. Well, even in
this situation people might want some varnish so long as the indirection or innuendo
in expressing the truth gently is understood by the host. Manners still count.
Two other plausible qualifications to truth telling maxims will show how these
complications can be addressed. First, “tell the truth except when the other party has
no rightful claim to expect or demand it from you.”141 This handles Kant’s infamous
hypothetical of a killer demanding to be told where his targeted victim is,142 perhaps
by creating uncertainty with the penumbral term “rightful.” Second, “tell the truth
except when it [immediately] puts third parties at [unreasonable, great] risk.” These
maxims deal with situations in which evildoers, such as terrorists, cyber criminals, or
the killer in Kant’s hypothetical, would foreseeably and wrongfully exploit facts
relating to security issues, if known. The word “third” in this second maxim could be
bracketed to address situations where, say, a person demands to know where her gun
is located so that she can retrieve it to commit suicide.143
David Owens, The Problem with Promising, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS, supra note 129,
at 58, 61.
140

“Intentional deception is a constituent of many acceptable forms of everyday social life,
such as tact, politeness, excuses, reticence, avoidance, or evasion, which are ways to protect
privacy, promote social harmony, and encourage interest.” Adler, supra note 138, at 435
(citation omitted). Kant would go along with this. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
“In contexts in which people usually say false things – for example, when telling stories that
are jokes – we are not deceived. If a story that is a joke and is false counts as a lie we can say
that a lie in this case in [sic] not wrong . . . .” KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 136. “Socially
appropriate lying is not merely tolerated, it is mandatory. The child who fails to master the
skill pays the heavy price of disapproval, punishment, and social ostracism.” DAVID L. SMITH,
WHY WE LIE 18 (2004).
141

Other commentators have advanced this “right to truth” idea. See Mahon, supra note
138, at 17-20.
142

See supra note 130.

143

“[M]ost of us think that there are some cases in which benevolent lies are permissible.”
KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 348. But Korsgaard asserts that justification of benevolent lies
“must . . . appeal to the lack of autonomy of the person lied to,” which requires “some criteria
for determining who is autonomous. But here we run into a difficulty. Autonomy in the
ordinary sense appears to be a matter of degree.” Id. at 350.
All of the qualifications within these three plausible maxims may fit with the “special
justification” limitations in Scanlon’s “principle forbidding lying”: “One may not, in the
absence of special justification, act with the intention of leading someone to form a false
belief about some matter, or with the aim of confirming a false belief he or she already holds.”
T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 318 (2000). Scanlon’s principle “forbids
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Turning to promise-keeping maxims, consider these.144 First, “keep promises
except when other prima facie moral duties are weightier under the circumstances.”
This applies when, for example, an agent who is rushing to keep a promised
appointment on time comes upon a person in dire need of a time-consuming rescue.
Another example is where a gratuitous promise to grant future resources to another
person, if kept, would prevent the promisor from substantially meeting her familial
duties. As stated, however, this broad maxim qualifier (“weightier under the
circumstances”) seems too open-ended. More detailed explication is required to
sharpen autonomy boundaries and guide conduct. The qualification is expressed as a
standard, whereas refined rules may be better. In practice, this broad standard might
serve as a meta-maxim to be honed by more specific “except when” provisos as
moral dilemmas are anticipated or arise. This could get very complex.
“Keep promises except when the performance [, unforeseeably at the time of the
promise,] will be [unreasonably, extremely] harmful to the promisee or others.” Akin
to the prior suicide example, these qualifications would excuse a promissory
commitment to temporarily keep a gun for the promisee when she asks for its return
while in an agitated or depressed state, having threatened to kill herself or others
with it. These general, standard-laden, qualified maxims remain subsumed by the
meta-maxim above.
When transgressing a general truth-telling or promise-keeping maxim, the
violator may not be using another person as means only to her own ends.145 She may
not be curtailing another person’s overall security or liberty. Beneficent paternalism
and “white” lies are both examples. They are aimed at boosting another person’s net
welfare.146 Nevertheless, some such violations may be disrespectful of the other
more than lying, since one can act with the aim of leading another to form a false belief
without saying anything that one believes to be false.” Id. See generally HILL, supra note 136,
at 25.
144

“Moral philosophers disagree not only as to the grounds and scope of promissory
duties, but also as to just what a promise is.” Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 695, 699 (2012) (distinguishing between narrow and broad conceptions). “A promise in
[Klass’s preferred] narrow sense is the expression of an intent to undertake a moral obligation
by the very communication of that intent.” Id. “It is this narrow sense of ‘promise’ that makes
promising the paradigm of a normative power, and which makes promises so important for
autonomy theories.” Id. at 700. Not all promises and promise-related assertions are the same.
Ayres and Klass identify “three categories of promissory representations” (positive, opaque,
and blank) and three “representations relative to some fixed probability” (definite-probability,
fully warranting, and semi-warranting). IAN AYERS & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES
44-45 (2005). “Promise something that you intend not to do is not just a tort, subject to
punitive damages, but can also be a crime.” Id. at 170 (“theft by deception”, “obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent . . . promises”). The “history of criminal seduction
. . . does demonstrate that the law has been willing to impose punitive sanctions for promises
that would not be enforceable through an action in contract.” Id. at 193.
145

By “another person” I am referring to the third parties as well as the recipient of the
communication. Lies work because most people tell the truth. Therefore, “it is not just the
person to whom you lie that you treat as a means, but all of those who tell the truth . . . .
[Relying on their truth telling] is explicitly treating their rational nature as a mere means:
indeed it is making a tool of other people’s good wills.” KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 127.
146
Lahav gives examples of when promissory obligations should be released and then
advances a general principle: “Where the promisee’s consent to breach is implied but not
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person’s dignity.147 Promise-breaking motivated by beneficent paternalism denies
the paternalized person the liberty to choose for herself, and the security from being
treated as less than a fully rational, ethical being.148 While the promise-breaker may
consider the promisee a moral equal, she does not treat her respectfully. A “white”
lie may signal the view that the listener cannot bear up under the weight of the bald
truth. Social niceties are one thing, but even “white” lies aimed at psychic benefits
may be contextually demeaning.
Qualified truth-telling and promise-keeping maxims effectively expand the
liberty of the asserter or promisor at the cost, oftentimes, of reducing the security of
another person. Sometimes, though, the security of the other person may also be
expanded in some sense, as where permissible “white” lies increase one’s security
from gratuitous psychic harm. This trajectory of analysis suggests a slippery slope
reasoning with the strong prospect of total paternalism at the bottom. In balancing
liberty and security interests, it is critical to keep the importance of respect in sight at
all times.
3. Reliance and Expectations
Disappointment of a person’s reliance or expectations commonly produces
harms.149 Reliance and expectation damages for contract breach are exemplary.
express, the promisee’s autonomy is nevertheless respected because two conditions are
satisfied: (1) the promisee would have consent to the breach, and (2) the breach was motivated
by the promisee’s interests.” Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its
Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 169 (2000). “I suggest here
that breach may often be seen as moral, once one appreciates that contracts are incompletely
detailed agreements and that breach may be committed in problematic contingencies that were
not explicitly addressed by the governing contracts.” Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract
May not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569
(2009); see Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006).
147

“But lying also, perhaps less obviously, trespasses autonomy where a lie is told in order
to foster autonomy, especially if the desire effect is achieved. That its offensive character may
be blunted does not alter the autonomy-robbing function of the lie.” MARINA OSHANA,
PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN SOCIETY 111 (2006) (referring to paternalistic intervention).
Nonetheless, “I believe a case can be made that strong paternalistic intervention is sometimes
needed to preserve the autonomy that is threatened by a competent and deserving person’s
self-regarding conduct, even where the target of the paternalistic gesture has not behaved in
ways that clearly permit infringements of autonomy.” Id. at 115. For justification, see id. at
115-17. Relatedly, Schwartzman argues that insincere political arguments are contrary to “to
the values of mutual respect and political legitimacy.” Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of
Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 375, 398 (2011).
148

“[A]utonomy is the good which paternalism fails to respect.” Marina A.L. Oshana,
Personal Autonomy and Society, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. 81, 82 (1998).
149
“Few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than
when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the hour of
need; . . . none excite more resentment, either in the person suffering, or in a sympathizing
spectator.” MILL, Utilitarianism, supra note 95, at 75.
While Corbin puts the protection of reasonable expectations at the center of contract
law, see 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed.
1993) (“The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations
Induced by Promises”), Owen would center it in tort law as well. “As in contract law, one
naturally focuses initially on the expectations of victims in security from harm.” David G.
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These are typically to rectify wrongful economic harms. In addition, tort law
provides examples where frustrating reliance can produce wrongful physical,
economic, and psychic harms. For example, where a person reasonably relies on a
railroad to continue providing a crossing guard,150 or on the government to operate a
lighthouse non-negligently.151 Dignitary harms may also ensue in these
circumstances. A person may reasonably be insulted by a transparently weak excuse
for breaking a non-promissory commitment (“I would have come to your house for
the weekly card game, but I forgot to get money.”). When, then, should the
disappointment of reliance or expectations be declared wrongful harms by means of
deontic maxims?
Reliance or expectations need not be linked to truth-telling or promise-keeping
maxims.152 For example, suppose a person relies on another person’s statement, “I
plan to make a substantial investment in this new company.” While truthful when
asserted, the speaker later changes her mind before or after the time the listener relies
on the statement by investing in the new company herself.153 Reliance or
expectations maxims, on the other hand, may provide the foundation for truth-telling
or promise-keeping maxims.154 Ronald Dworkin champions this view:
Owen, Expectations in Tort, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1287, 1289 (2011). Noting that reasonable
expectations also drive property law, Owen observes, “[e]xpectations might preliminarily be
viewed as twin pillars of tort, then, because we robustly count the expectations of both actors
and victims alike.” Id. at 1289-90 (citation omitted). Pound also puts the protection of
reasonable expectations at the center of the law. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 188-89 (1922); ROSCOE POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 3, 5-6,
17, 28-31 (1951).
150

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930).

151

See Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 (2011).
152

See AYERS & KLASS, supra note 144, at 203.

153

Dworkin argues that even if the statement is true when asserted, if it later becomes false
(e.g., by cancelling a commitment to attend a conference) one harms another person whose
expectations were aroused by being told of the commitment, whether or not she relied on it,
and has the responsibility not to do so. See DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 305-08. Scanlon
embraces the “principle of Loss Prevention”:
If one has intentionally or negligently led someone to expect that one is going to
follow a certain course of action, X, and one has good reason to believe that that
person will suffer significant loss as a result of this expectation if one does not follow
X, then one must take reasonable steps to prevent that loss.
SCANLON, supra note 143, at 300-01. For challenges to Scanlon’s position, see JOHN DEIGH,
EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE LAW 184-95 (2008). Cf. Stephen A. Smith, Performance,
Punishment and the Nature of Contractual Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360, 368 (1997)
(observing there is no contractual obligation for the types of assertions discussed by Dworkin
and Scanlon).
154
For the debate over whether the duty of promise keeping is grounded on social
practices, thereby implying a (partial) grounding in reliance and expectation maxims, or is an
independent moral obligation, see TUNICK, supra note 128, at 50-54. Those declaring the
obligation independent of social practices include Kant, Locke, Grotius, McNeilly, Downie,
MacCormick, and Scanlon, while those disagreeing include Hume, H.L.A. Hart, Rawls,
Melden, Prichard, Hamlyn, Anscombe, Pitkin, and Searle. See id. For example, Tunick
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Promising is not an independent source of a distinct kind of moral duty.
Rather it plays an important but not exclusive role in fixing the scope of a
more general responsibility: not to harm other people by first encouraging
them to expect that we will act in a certain way and then not acting in that
way. That general responsibility is itself a case of the even more general
responsibility . . . to respect the dignity of others and in that way to
respect our own dignity.155
Dworkin makes a similar argument for truth telling grounded on respect for
dignity.156
This section examines a sampling of plausible reliance and expectations maxims
from broad to narrow. This exercise is to preliminarily reckon the reasonability of
adopting such maxims. It overlooks myriad relevant factors that would bear on
specifics. Thus, needed “except when” clauses are neglected.157 While I put together
reliance and expectations in the maxims for the sake of expediency, surely one
would usually adopt maxims that separate them out, as under the existing law where
reliance often receives more protection than “mere” expectations. Or, the
substantive, first-order maxims may cover the two together, but the requital, secondorder maxims may distinguish them, or both.
“Do not disappoint another person’s reliance or expectations.” This maxim is too
general to realistically be considered for adoption.158 It severely sacrifices liberty for
the sake of very expansive security. As one example, owing to human nature, a
person’s hope for aid or support from others, perhaps unreasonable or even
desperate, is too easily aroused and ripened into reliance or expectations to warrant
blanket claims against those other persons.

identifies MacCormick’s conditions for an obligation to keep a promise, which are
independent of social practices: “A. You rely on me doing x; B. You would suffer if I did not
do x; and C. I knowingly or intentionally induced you to rely on my doing x . . . .” Id. at 58.
See Neil MacCormick & Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 59, 59-78 (1972).
155
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 304. Notice Dworkin’s mention of dignity. Dworkin
follows Scanlon in adopting an expectations justification for promise keeping. See id. at 307
(quoting Scanlon’s “principle of fidelity”). In Scanlon’s own words, “The account I will offer
[regarding ‘the obligation to keep a promise and other related obligations’] describes such
obligations as one special case of a wider category of duties and obligations regarding the
expectations that we lead others to form about what we intend to do.” SCANLON, supra note
143, at 295. See id. at 295-327. For critiques of Scanlon’s “expectationalism”, see Allen
Habib,
Promises,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
29-31,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/ (last visited May 8, 2016).
156

“If you were lying [to me] . . . then you have harmed me just in that act. Dignity
explains why . . . .” DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 305. “You harm me when you lie to me even
if your lie makes no further difference because I don’t believe you, or because your lie makes
no difference to what I do, or because I suffer no further harm in acting on it.” Id.
157

The examples discussed above of exceptions to broad promise-keeping maxims to
account for unexpected rescue delays and family obligations could likewise apply to reliance
and expectations maxims. See discussion supra note 144.
158

“Someone who relies upon a promise made to someone else . . . acquires no right by
doing so.” STEVENS, supra note 41, at 15.
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“Do not [foreseeably] disappoint another person’s reasonable reliance or
expectations that you have aroused.” Reasonable, foreseeable reliance or
expectations may result from a bare, legally unenforceable promise or a mere
express or implied statement.159 The word “reasonable” may suggest a focus of
foreseeability not on the arouser or purported invader, but rather on the arousee, the
supposed invadee. Yet it is less reasonable for an arousee to rely on an arouser’s
communication if she foresees that the arouser cannot reasonably foresee the
arousee’s reliance.160 Reasonable foreseeability is relevant for both arousee and
arouser. Blameworthiness, both responsibility and disrespect, emphasizes this.
Foreseeability is commonly an element of a claim for the protection of reliance or
expectations under existing law,161 as in the doctrine of promissory estoppel.162 The
reasonability of reliance is usually situated or framed by norms, such as legal or
moral principles, social mores and practices, that give meaning to statements or
conduct.163 The topic of norms is discussed below.
“Do not foreseeably disappoint reasonable reliance or expectations that you
arouse by a communication meant for the particular arousee.” This is an example of
a narrowed maxim designed to limit third-party claims. Protection of unreasonable
reliance or expectations, of sorts, may also be morally justified in particular
circumstances, as when the arouser knows that the arousee is unaware of a trumping
norm (e.g., a statute) that frees the arouser from legal liability. Likewise when the
arouser knows that the arousee is acting under severe constraints (e.g., coercive
desperation). Account may be taken for situations in which the arouser becomes
aware of the reliance or expectations sometime after the triggering
communication.164 Perhaps some such accounts should be limited by a narrow
requital maxim. For example, “reasonably caution an arousee who may be

159
Scanlon advances “the principle of Due Care”: “One must exercise due care not to lead
others to form reasonable but false expectations about what one will do when one has good
reason to believe that they would suffer significant loss as a result of relying on these
expectations.” SCANLON, supra note 143, at 300.
160

“The foreseeable possibility of detriment, whether by the reliance of the claimant or a
third party, is relevant and will commonly be decisive in determining whether, as a matter of
construction, the defendant has by his actions implicitly assumed responsibility towards the
claimant.” STEVENS, supra note 41, at 14.
161

For example, “[a] misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a
reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to
induce the recipient to do so.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981).
162
See id. § 90 (1981). “[P]romissory-fraud actions might lie not only in the cases where
promissory estoppel is accompanied by misrepresentations of intent but also where even
without promise, a speaker’s non-promissory prediction of the future misrepresents the
speaker’s true intent.” AYERS & KLASS, supra note 144, at 145.
163
“Come on back now, you hear,” may be a casual farewell nicety in some communities,
but a true invitation elsewhere. See generally Bailey Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally
Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19 (1997).
164
Such accounts might cover cases outside the reach of the next considered deontic
boundary marker, exploitation, since here the arouser expects or desires no advantage from the
arousee’s reliance and expectations. Nevertheless, there may be common features to the
exploitation maxims, as where the arousee is acting under partial ignorance or coercion.
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foreseeably disappointed by unreasonable reliance or expectations that you arouse by
a communication meant for her.”165
There is a multitude of plausible reliance and expectations maxims. The adoption
of any particular maxim within the limits of the categorical imperative is supposedly
optional.166 Though perhaps optional, it strikes me as unlikely that a reasonable,
sensible agent would reject all forms of reliance and expectations maxims. At the
extremes, altogether unprotected reliance or expectations would severely impact
both liberty and security interests. Especially when knowing or purposive, a
disappointed arousal may be disrespectful. Disappointment may involve use of the
arousee as a means only. Perhaps a survivalist living alone in the wilderness would
reject all such maxims, but not the rest of us.
4. Exploitation (Advantage-taking)
The foundational assumption that moral and legal agents, owing to their rational
nature, are responsible for their choices and conduct is often put to the test when it
comes to exploitation or advantage taking.167 Circumstances facilitating exploitation
are ones in which the exploitee is making a choice under some degree of ignorance
or coercion, internal (e.g., cognitive dissonance, impulse) or external (e.g., fraud,
economic duress).168 Her choice is impaired.169 The exploitee, nevertheless, may not

165
Cf. TINALEA (“This is not a legally enforceable agreement”) clauses; see AYERS &
KLASS, supra note 144, at 157-58.
166

See generally Johnson, supra note 130.

167

“In the moralized sense used here, exploitation is generally understood as taking unfair
advantage.” RUTH J. SAMPLE, EXPLOITATION 7 (2003) (citation omitted). “To characterize an
action as exploitative is to commit oneself to a substantive moral view since, as Joel Feinberg
has noted, the essence of exploitation is ‘a way of using another person that is somehow
wrongful or unfair.’” MICHAEL J. GORR, COERCION, FREEDOM AND EXPLOITATION 8 (1989)
(quoting Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in PATERNALISM 201, 202 (Rolf Sartorius
ed., 1983)). Wertheimer is less sure. “[W]hereas the moral force of coercion is relatively clear,
as a coerced agreement is not binding, the moral force of exploitation is not clear, for it is not
obvious what follows from characterizing an agreement as exploitative.” Alan Wertheimer,
Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 889, 894 (1997).
168
That exploitation does not require coercion, see SAMPLE, supra note 167, at 11-12.
“Whereas coercion refers to the formation of an agreement, exploitation seems to always
include reference to the substance or outcome of an agreement.” Wertheimer, supra note 167,
at 896. Gorr distinguishes “incapacity” exploitation from “circumstantial” exploitation. See
GORR, supra note 167, at 151.
169

For example, the German Civil Code provides:

[A] legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament,
inexperience, lack of sound judgment or considerable weakness of will of another,
causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to be promised
or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to the
performance.”
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, in FAULT IN AMERICAN
CONTRACT LAW 82, 86-87 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010) (quoting Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, § 138(2) (F.R.G.) (emphasis
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suffer physical, economic, or psychic harm from the exploitation.170 She may even
be benefitted in these senses, as where she is enticed to enter into a contract that nets
more gains than otherwise obtainable.171 But in one sense, one key to my exposition,
the exploitee is harmed—her dignity is not respected.172 Sometimes she is used as a
means only.173 Even when the exploitee benefits, perhaps more than does the
exploiter,174 she still suffers a dignitary harm. She is not treated with respect. She has
deontic reason to object.175
Some issues of exploitation may fall within the province of substantive maxims
about truth telling or promise keeping. Where an agent’s impaired choice results
from deceit or the violation of a duty to disclose, truth telling is implicated.176 If an
added). Sample argues that exploitation does not require vulnerability. See SAMPLE, supra
note 167, at 27-54.
170
In recent years, mutually beneficial exploitation has drawn most of the philosophical
attention. “[Harmful] exploitation has not received much attention, partly, I suspect, because
its wrongfulness has seemed obvious, and therefore philosophically uninteresting, and partly
because the wrongfulness of such actions can usually be explained by reference to some other
less controversial and obscure moral concept such as coercion or deception.” Matt Zwolinski,
Book Review, 121 ETHICS 228, 228 (2010).
171
“Exploitation can occur even when the exploited party benefits from, and would
voluntarily consent to, the transaction. She may gain more than her exploiter.” Matthew
Rendall, Non-identity, Sufficiency and Exploitation, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 229, 237 (2011).
“Exploitation may not fall within the harm principle because the ‘victim’ is not harmed but is
inadequately benefited . . . . Yet arguably, each of these types of conduct is immoral.”
Alexander, supra note 107, at 855. For a taxonomy of exploitation, see Wertheimer, supra
note 167, at 897-99.
172

“On my account relationships can be voluntary, noncoerced, and even mutually
beneficial and yet may be subject to the moral criticism that they are exploitative. The badness
stems from the degradation of one or more of the agents in a transaction for advantage.”
SAMPLE, supra note 167, at 5. Sample refers to her “account of exploitation” as “Exploitation
as Degradation.” Id. at 56.
173

If the advantaged agent does nothing to induce the choice by the disadvantaged one, as
where she passively accepts an offered gratuity based on known misinformation, it seems that
she is using the other agent as a means only in, at best, a weak sense.
174
“Much exploitation is, paradoxically, mutually beneficial. This accommodates the fact
that moral agents can fail to demonstrate respect for persons not simply in the course of
harming them, but also when improving their situation . . . .” SAMPLE, supra note 167, at 57.
Even in some of these cases, as where the exploitee agrees to a contract beneficial to her, she
may have been able to capture more of the consumer surplus if her choice was not impaired.
But because the exploited person may benefit, Sample argues, “Much exploitation seems to be
activity with which we should not interfere.” Id. at 86. One reason is that “the consequences
for the exploited person are often worse if he is not exploited.” Id.
175
Recent philosophical examinations of exploitation have two foci: “[T]he former
focuses on the fairness or unfairness of the transaction, while the latter bases its assessment on
a broadly Kantian idea of respect for persons. Both of these approaches, in turn, admit of
specification in a broad variety of ways.” Matt Zwolinski, Structural Exploitation, 29(1) SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 154, 157 (Winter 2012) (footnote omitted).
176

Against the right to take advantage of another’s ignorance of material facts, Trebilcock
observes, “It may be plausible to argue that the buyer’s conduct violates the Kantian
categorical imperative of equal concern and respect in that if the roles were reversed . . . , the
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exploitee waives an exploiter’s promissory obligation because of her impaired
condition, then promise keeping is implicated, whether or not the exploiter causes
the impairment. Other exploitation circumstances may fall within the province of
reliance or expectations maxims. Such maxims, for example, may protect
unreasonable reliance or expectations induced or taken advantage of by an exploiter
aware of the other party’s impaired condition.177 These other types of maxims,
however, will not do all the work of protecting against exploitation in all its forms.
Since choices are perhaps always somewhat impaired, and other agents may
benefit from the impairments whether or not they induced them, or were even aware
of them, the adoption of plausible exploitation maxims must settle difficult questions
about where to draw this autonomy space boundary line.178 First, exploitation
advantage taking is: “At the most general level, A exploits B when A takes unfair
advantage of B . . . . One problem with such a broad account . . . is that there will ‘be
as many competing conceptions of exploitation as theories of what persons owe to
each other by way of fair treatment.’”179 This section briefly explores some tenable
conceptions, looking down various avenues.180
buyer would not wish his ignorance to be exploited by the seller in this fashion . . . .”
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 117 (1993). Fried agrees that
taking advantage of another’s ignorance for one’s own economic gain is disrespectful. See
FRIED, supra note 127, at 78-79. In response, one commentator notes, “There is, in the context
of pre-contractual bargaining, a variety of plausible conceptions of what respect for persons
requires. For instance, it is plausible to recognize a significant line between fraudulent
misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts.” Marc Ramsay, The Buyer/Seller
Asymmetry: Corrective Justice and Material Non-Disclosure, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 115, 135
(2006). As discussed in the next paragraph, I agree with Ramsay.
Purposive deceit for one’s own purposes is, of course, far out of bounds. It uses another
person merely for one’s own ends. “Taking all forms of injustice into account, none is more
deadly than that practiced by people who act as if they are good men when they are being
most treacherous.” CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 23 (Harry G. Edinger trans., 1974) (44 B.C.E.). The
Lilliputians, Swift reports, “look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft . . . ; for they allege,
that care and vigilance, with a very common understanding, may preserve a man’s goods from
thieves, but honesty has no defense against superior cunning . . . .” AYERS & KLASS, supra
note 144, at 176-77 (quoting JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 48-49 (Arthur Case ed.,
1938) (1726)).
177
Disappointed reliance or expectations may not involve exploitation or using the invadee
as a means only, as where the arouser did not intend, expect or actually gain anything from the
arousee’s behavior.
178
“Some commentators have suggested that the rules of what does (and does not)
constitute duress can best be seen as a set of collective choices regarding what sort of
‘advantage taking’ or ‘strategic behavior’ we will condone (or even encourage) in transactions
. . . .” Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 139, at 251, 257-58.
Kronman would allow advantage taking so long as “the welfare of most people who are taken
advantage of in a particular way be increased by the kind of advantage-taking in question.”
Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 487 (1980)
(footnote omitted).
179

Alan
Wertheimer,
Exploitation,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
4,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/ (last visited May 8, 2016) (reference omitted)
(sampling accounts of exploitation at 4-7). “Some accounts invoke the Kantian notion that one
wrongfully exploits when one treats another instrumentally or merely as a means.” Id. at 7.
“On some accounts, the exploited party must be harmed, . . . the exploited party may gain
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“Do not accept benefits ensuing from another person’s [foreseeable]
[substantial] shortfall from the conditions for fully [reasonably, substantially]
responsible [autonomous] choice.” Under these maxims, to produce a wrongful
harm, an exploiter need not be a source of the exploitee’s condition of impaired
choice.181 Without the exploiter’s involvement in the exploitee’s impairment, some
courts and commentators insist these maxims go too far toward protecting the
exploitee’s security interest,182 while others disagree.183
from the relationship, . . . the exploited party must be coerced, . . . [there must be] a defect in
the quality of the consent, . . . exploitation can be fully voluntary.” Id. at 7. For the
“definitional landscape” of “exploitation”, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 10-12
(1996).
“[W]hat is a ‘desperate vulnerability’ and what is it to ‘exploit’ or ‘unjustly exploit’ or
‘shamefully exploit’ such a vulnerability? . . . Even given our likely agreement on extreme
cases, however, there is little hope that we could formulate some neat and simple rule to make
formal determinations for all cases.” Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard
Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1981) (looking to the contract doctrine of unconscionability
for “hints”).
180
The extent to which foreseeability should be part of the maxims is generally addressed
above in the examination of reliance and expectation maxims. See discussion supra Part
IV.A.3.
181
“Genuinely pure exploitation can occur only in cases in which the offeror does no more
than take advantage of a pre-existing incapacity.” GORR, supra note 167, at 152. “‘Exploiters
are typically opportunists, they extract advantage from situations that are not of their own
making. Coercers, on the other hand, are typically makers, rather than mere discoverers and
users, of opportunities.’” Id. at 155 (quoting Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in
PATERNALISM 201, 208 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983)).
182
Regarding coercion, as to whether a risk has been assumed voluntarily, “it does not
matter that the plaintiff is coerced to assume the risk by some force not emanating from
defendant, such as poverty, dearth of living quarters, or a sense of moral responsibility.”
Gibson v. Beaver, 226 A.2d 273, 276 (Md. 1967) (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES, JR., TORTS §  21.3 (1956)). “[T]he pressure of commercial or economic necessities in
no wise caused by the wrongful act of him who seeks to profit by them . . . will not render his
act in so utilizing his neighbor’s distress for his own advantage legally wrongful.” Francis H.
Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 25 (1906). “True coercion, to put
it crudely, requires not merely an unhappy choice but a villain who is responsible for creating
the necessity of making that choice.” Murphy, supra note 179, at 87; see Hila Keren,
Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 684 (2013); Zwolinski, supra note 175, at
155 (“[C]onsideration of background injustices [should] play [a fairly little role] in the correct
understanding of exploitation.”).
183
Consent to otherwise tortious conduct resulting from a substantial mistake concerning
the nature or expected extent of the invasion is invalid when “the mistake is known to the
other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
892B(2) (1977) (emphasis added). Though a party’s constrained choice is not due to an
advantage-taker, “it seems clear that if such circumstances were known and advantage taken
of them by the other party a degree of pressure which would not ordinarily amount to duress,
might have such coercive effect as to invalidate a transaction.” 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1608 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). The term “exploit”, like “take
advantage”, suggests at least an awareness, or reason to know, by the exploiter of the
exploitee’s impaired condition. For duress, the general rule grants relief for third-party
coercion “unless the other party to the transaction in good faith and without reason to know of
the duress either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). Feinberg “conclude[s] that coercive offers made in
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“Do not [foreseeably, purposely] undermine [substantially, unreasonably] the
conditions for [fully] responsible [autonomous] choice of another person and then
[unduly] exploit her impaired choice.” If ever exploitation would be seen as
producing a wrongful harm, it would be under maxims such as these. The exploiter
is not the least bit respectful of the exploitee’s dignity and would likely be using her
as a means only. Legal doctrines reaching this conduct, include fraud, deceit, duress,
coercion, and undue influence.
“Do not [purposely, intentionally, foreseeably] undermine [substantially,
unreasonably] the conditions for [fully] responsible [autonomous] choice of another
person.” These maxims, while broader than the ones immediately above, may be
abridged without the violator gaining any advantage from the violation. It would not
seem, therefore, that the violator is necessarily using the disadvantaged person as a
means only, but such conduct may still be disrespectful by not treating the person as
an end in herself,184 and may affect the person’s liberty and security interests in her
later impaired dealings with others. Still, when the violator gains nothing, she is not
an exploiter in the usual sense. Is there a sufficient dignitary harm before the
disadvantaged person chooses conduct influenced by her impaired condition? When
requital by the maxim violator is called for, should she be responsible for harms to
the disadvantaged person caused in part by interactions with third parties? If so,
should this protection be limited to cases in which the third party is not herself an
exploiter? In answering these and other questions relating to exploitation,
reasonable, principled, people can certainly disagree with one another.
5. Risk Imposition
When an agent’s conduct puts another person at risk,185 does the risk by itself
harm the other person? This depends, to begin with, on what is meant by a risk.186
circumstances deliberately created by the offeror for the purposes of exploitation do normally
invalidate consent, whereas coercive offers made by a party who had no role in creating the
circumstances of vulnerability . . . very often do not invalidate consent.” JOEL FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF 246 (1986); see id. at 176, 197.
184
The failure to respect a person as an end in herself is different from using her as a
means only. See F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 13 (2007); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY 81-85
(2012); SCANLON, supra note 87, at 89-121 (“Means and Ends”).
185

“There is no form of activity (or inactivity either for that matter) that does not involve
some risk.” FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 101.
186
“Risk is defined as a situation in which numerical probabilities can be attached to the
various possible outcomes of each course of action . . . .” JON ELSTER, Introduction, in
RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 5 (Jon Elster ed., 1986). “There are famously different interpretations of
the notion of risk. Dividing these interpretations into two rough categories, we can say there
are objective and subjective accounts of risk.” Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 963, 972-73 (2003) (footnote omitted). As examples of Finkelstein’s categories, see
Alexander, supra note 107, at 825 (“Risk is an epistemic rather than an ontic notion, and it is
always assessed from a particular informational perspective.”); Larry Alexander, Insufficient
Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 936 (2000)
(“Risk is always relative to someone’s perspective, a perspective that is defined by possession
of certain information but not other information.”). See generally Sven O. Hansson, Risk,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/ (last visited May 8, 2016).
Feinberg identifies risk within the harm principle as a compound of the magnitude and
probability of harm. See FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 191.
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The first definition of “risk” in Black’s Law Dictionary is edifying: “The uncertainty
of a result, happening, or loss; the chance of injury, damage, or loss; esp., the
existence and extent of the possibility of harm . . . .”187 “Injury”, “damage”, and
“loss” are normally associated with harm, though not necessarily wrongful harm.188
If we focus on “[t]he uncertainty of a result, happening,” it does not appear that the
creation of a risk needs to be harmful in itself. For instance, when an agent attempts
to effectuate a rescue of another person, there is typically some risk, some chance,
that the agent will fail. This uncertainty does not necessarily produce a harm to the
rescuee, a setback to her overall interests. In a strong sense, the risky rescue attempt
promotes the rescuee’s interests. The rescue attempt has features of both a setback to
a particular interest and a promotion of the same or another interest. A carefully
hurled lifebuoy may hit the rescuee and injure her. Whether or not it injures her, the
lifebuoy may also save her life. Is, then, the creation of a risk from hurling the
lifebuoy a harm to her? Yes, and no. It depends on how we characterize the chancy
action. We may speak in broad terms, “is a risky rescue attempt (for which there is
no better alternative) harmful to the rescuee?” Put this way, the answer, at least when
the chance of succeeding at the rescue outweighs the chance of making things worse,
is no. We may be more specific and deconstruct the conduct, one aspect being, “is
the risk that a hurled lifebuoy will hit a rescuee harmful to her?” Put this way
without more, it is easy to answer yes. In this context, the broader characterization of
the risk seems more normatively appropriate. This gambit of telescoping an
identified risk may be referred to as “the specificity of risk characterization.”189 In a
With regard to “imposing a risk”, “risk must be conceived in an objective rather than in
an epistemic sense, and it must generally be regarded as the joint creation of two interacting
actors or activities rather than as something that one person has unilaterally imposed upon
another.” Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 27, at 74 (reference omitted). As
Perry notes, this suggests the Coase Theorem. See id. at 85-86; Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). What-is-a-risk-of-what?
187

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (8th ed. 2004).

188

“In non-technical contexts, the word ‘risk’ refers, often rather vaguely, to situations in
which it is possible but not certain that some undesirable event will occur.” Hansson, supra
note 186, at 1. “Injury” has been defined as a harm that is legally protected against, meaning, a
wrongful harm. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1979) (“Injury and Harm”).
189
The idea stems from Judge Magruder’s discussion in Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604,
610 (1st Cir. 1955) (“Flexibility [in “decid[ing] each of an infinite variety of cases”] is . . .
preserved by the further need of defining the risk, or risks, either narrowly, or more broadly,
as seems appropriate and just in the special type of case.”). “The linking of doing to suffering
requires describing the risk at a level of generality appropriate both to what the defendant did
and what the plaintiff suffered.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law 23 VAL. U.L.
REV. 485, 521 (1989). Pursuant to “the multiple description problem . . . [o]ne can describe
any harm particularly enough to say of it (under that description) that it was unforeseeable or
generally enough to say of it (under the second description) that it was foreseeable.” MOORE,
supra note 56, at 364-65 (citing Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 189 (1952)). Feinberg “speak[s] of ‘relativity to the description of the act.’ Described
as ‘signing that legal document,’ the act was involuntary. Described as ‘exercising the limited
choice permitted by the gunman,’ the act was voluntary.” FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 123.
We may distinguish “a thin act-description” from “a thick one. Actually they are ‘thick’ and
‘thin’ only relative to one another, since there is a kind of breadth spectrum permitting a
whole range of act descriptions, some thicker than others.” Id. at 129. See John Oberdiek,
Towards a Right Against Risking, 28 LAW & PHIL. 367, 384-87 (2009) (“reference class”).
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lawsuit, the accepted specificity of the risk in issue is often outcome determinative.
This gambit also affects moral judgments of imposed risks.
Instead of the “risk” that the rescuee will be saved by the hurled lifebuoy, we
normally think of this likelihood as a chance, prospect, or possibility without
negative connotations.190 For this Article’s purposes, the relevant meaning of “risk”
is narrower than simply the uncertainty or chance of a result or happening. The idea
of injury, damage, or loss is crucial. Is, then, the creation of a risk of loss in itself a
harm? Courts and commentators espouse various views. Some declare that creating a
risk is in itself a harm,191 while others hold that it is not.192 Some suggest that
190

Finkelstein “argue[s] that a chance of benefit is itself a benefit.” Finkelstein, supra note
186, at 966.
191

“[C]reating a risk [of harm] is itself a kind of harm . . . . [I]t harms me when you drive
carelessly in my street even if you miss me.” DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 306. “[E]ven if we
attend only to harmful conduct, the Harm Principle must permit the criminalization of conduct
that either causes or creates a risk of harm.” R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 125 (2007)
(citing FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 11 (“conduct that causes serious primary harm, or the
unreasonable risk of such harm”)). “[I]mposition of risk and imposition of harm are not
distinct forms of conduct. They are identical conduct viewed from an ex ante and ex post
perspective, respectively.” Barbara H. Fried, The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to
Torts, 18 LEGAL THEORY 231, 239 (2012). Fried points out that the law often protects against
ex ante risk alone and identifies “a number of curious implications” of the rejection of such
protection. See id. at 242-44. She discusses various “possibilities . . . floated for explaining the
wrong of risk in deontological terms.” Id. at 244-48 (“Harm includes expected harm,” “[r]iskcreation is a completed harm,” and “[r]isk-creation violates a different right from the right to
be free from harm”). “If a person X imposes an unreasonable risk on a person Y, then, even if
the risk does not eventuate in any tangible damage, Y has suffered a genuine loss (albeit a loss
that is perhaps not practicably compensable).” Matthew Kramer, Of Aristotle and Ice Cream
Cones: Reflections on Jules Coleman’s Theory of Corrective Justice, in ANALYZING LAW,
supra note 93, at 163, 166. Kramer finds support from Coleman. “We can treat a reduction in
security as a loss, and in the event it results from another’s wrong, it can be a wrongful loss.”
Id. (quoting Jules Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.KENT L. REV. 451, 465 (1987)). Finkelstein argues that “the imposition of a risk [is] a harm to
the person on whom it is inflicted.” Finkelstein, supra note 186, at 965 (emphasis omitted). “I
claim that risk harm is a form of harm that is independent of outcome harm, on the grounds
that minimizing one’s risk exposure is an element of an agent’s basic welfare.” Id. at 966. But
Finkelstein is cautious about pushing the risk of harm from dangerous conduct too far.
“[F]irst, this would be only a ‘secondary’ harm, the harmful character of which derives from
that of the primary harm which is risked.” DUFF, supra, at 125. Still, might not this secondary
harm still be justifiably proscribed? Secondly, Finkelstein observes, some criminalized
dangerous conduct does not “actually expose[] others to a risk of harm: someone who drives
recklessly round a blind corner is guilty of dangerous driving even if the road is in fact clear
and no one is actually exposed to a risk.” Id. Yet these “harmless” occurrent risks may also
produce harms from the risk of future wrongful risks. Such a reckless driver may be more
likely to drive recklessly when someone is exposed to the risk. Knowing this, a cautious
driver’s conduct may be negatively affected by defensive tactics. See Kimberly K. Ferzan,
Plotting Premeditation’s Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 102 (2012) (“actions at one
time that create a risk of a later harm are culpable at the time the risk is first created”). For
citations to other commentators who see a (substantial) risk of harm as a harm in itself, see
Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1, 32 n.94 (1989) (Nozick, Fishkin, Gross, Thomson).
Perry endorses Epstein’s equating the imposition of a known risk of harm to intentional
harm. “[T]he imposition of a known risk, or at least of a known, substantial risk, to someone
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creating a risk is, at some point, in itself a wrongful harm,193 while others see it to the
contrary.194 “In summary, the problem of appraising risks from a moral point of view
does not seem to have any satisfactory solution in established moral theories.”195
else’s person or property seems to be akin to the ‘taking’ which Epstein says is involved in
intentionally causing harm to another for the purpose of furthering one’s own ends.” Perry,
Impossibility, supra note 93, at 149.
192
Hurd asks, “Why is it that corrective justice theorists have unanimously eschewed the
imposition of liability for risk-taking alone?” Heidi M. Hurd, Correcting Injustice to
Corrective Justice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 81 (1991). For her answers, the key one being
“no harm, no foul”, see id. at 81-84. Under corrective justice, “[c]oherence requires that the
injustice relate act to injury and vice versa . . . . As negligence law recognizes, the injustice
does not consist merely in the unreasonably created risk considered in itself; that would onesidedly focus on the defendant’s wrongful action and entail liability for unreasonable riskcreation even without damage.” WEINRIB, supra note 83, at 3. “Those who are exposed to
unrealized risks have no grounds for complaint [even when the risks are wrongful], for their
rights to security are intact.” Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in
an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 214, 224.
“Stated simply, it is either implausible or inaccurate to define ‘harm’ such that a person can be
harmed without knowing about it and without any identifiable setback to the person’s
interests.” Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 IA. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (2009). See,
e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 165 (“The threat of future harm, not yet realized, is
not enough.”); Fried, supra note 191, at 240-41 (objecting while providing further citations);
Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 193, 208 (2000); Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 27, at 321, 330-39 (“Is Risk a Harm
in Itself?”). To the contrary, I argue that such a risk may produce damage, a loss, a restriction
of one’s autonomous choices, that is, a harm. Even when ignorant of the risk, it may produce
at least a dignitary harm, which does not require knowledge by the invadee. Adler suggests the
question of whether risk is a harm my turn on whether one adopts a Bayesian or frequentist
account of risk. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of
Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1298-302 (2003).
193
Under the Model Penal Code, “A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly
engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious
bodily injury.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962) (Recklessly Endangering Another Person).
Schroeder challenges the “feature” of tort law that requires caused harm by contending that,
under corrective justice, one should be liable for “increas[ing] the risk of harm occurring,
whether or not it eventually does.” Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability
for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 439 (1990). In responding to criticism of his
thesis, Schroeder asks, “is the risk of harm itself a harm? The answer may be yes, but less
obviously than in the case of physical injury.” Id. at 160 (footnote omitted). Cf. Ferzan, supra
note 191, at 102 (“actions at one time that create a risk of a later harm are culpable at the time
the risk is first created”).
194
See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262-65
(1996). Morse rejects Hurd’s argument “that it is viciously circular and deontologically
unacceptable to construe creating risks as wrongs . . . .” Stephen J. Morse, Reasons, Results,
and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 394 (citing Hurd, supra, at 264-65).
“Harms and wrongs are distinct. Moreover, I see no reason why it is deontologically
unacceptable to consider violations of duties to others as wrongs, even in the absence of
resulting harms. What could be more obviously wrong in itself than intentionally breaching a
moral duty owed to others?” Id. I would put Morse’s argument this way. Whether or not
creating a risk is seen as a harm in itself, when the conduct violates a deontic maxim, it
produces a wrongful harm – a dignitary harm if nothing else. Hence, all deontic duty
violations entail harms, indeed, wrongful harms.
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Since harm is either physical, economic, psychic, or dignitary, the inquiry
resolves to whether a risk of harm in itself is one of these four types.196 A
hypothetical might help. Imagine an agent is target shooting on her large, isolated
ranch without any reason to believe that another person is put at risk by this activity.
Unknown to her, a person is within range of her bullets because he landed on her
property due to the vagaries of his hot-air ballooning. Assume the person at risk is
also totally unaware of the shooting risk to him. Without being hit or made aware,
does he suffer one of the four types of harms?197 Because there is no knowledge of
the risk by either party, there certainly are no physical or psychic harms at the time.
Nor is there a dignitary harm. The shooter is not disrespecting the party
unknowingly, unforeseeably put at risk. Perhaps there is an economic harm of some
type. If aware of the (substantial) risk, the balloonist would have taken safety
measures, including the willingness to pay the agent to stop shooting. This seems to
stretch the everyday understanding of what constitutes an economic harm. There are
no out-of-pocket losses or even standard lost opportunities.198 The ignorance of the
risk precludes the opportunity of the person to take safety measures, but it is the
ignorance of the risk that generates this lost opportunity, not the risk itself. Ignorance
of any beneficial trade, such as a better deal on a hot-air balloon purchase, causes
this kind of lost chance, but we do not normally think of these losses in terms of
protected economic harms. These losses, rather, are missed economic benefits, like
the failure to invest in a growth stock because one neglects available information or
is risk averse. Unless we subscribe to an expansive notion of economic harm, which

195
Hansson, supra note 186, at 13. Goldberg and Zipursky distinguish “the pure-conduct
conception of wrongs,” in which risky conduct may be a wrong in itself, from “the injuryinclusive conception of wrongs,” in which the conduct alone is insufficient. John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 934-35 (2010)
(emphasis omitted). “Overwhelmingly, modern tort theorists have assumed or insisted that the
idea of an injury-inclusive wrong is incoherent.” Id. (footnote omitted).
196
“On my view, the value of autonomy is related to risk in that being subject to risk can
narrow one’s acceptable options by narrowing one’s safe options, and this constitutes a
diminution of autonomy.” Oberdiek, supra note 189, at 373. I would identify this as a
dignitary harm, at least.
197
Oberdiek discusses a hypothetical in which the shooter is aware of the risk, but the
person at risk (you) is not. “It is . . . a diminution of your autonomy even though you were
unaware that you were targeted. The acceptability of options, and thus their normative
availability, depends not upon one’s belief that exercising them would be safe, but upon the
fact that the option, if exercised, would be safe.” Id. at 374. Under this reasoning, any fact
relevant to an agent’s choice, known to her or not, affects her autonomy, whether or not the
creator of that fact is aware of the impact. Cf. Alan Wertheimer, Victimless Crimes, 87 ETHICS
302, 308 (1977) (“One can surely be victimized without feeling victimized, as when one
unknowingly consumes a harmful product or is unknowingly victimized by corporate
conspiracies to raise prices.”).
198

“Cost to the economist is ‘opportunity cost’ – the benefit forgone by employing a
resource in a way that denies its use to someone else.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (2d ed. 1977). Moore refers to “the well-charted human tendency to
regard out of pocket costs as more serious than opportunity costs of equal value. Economists
have long charted such ‘framing effects’ in popular psychology . . . .” MICHAEL S. MOORE,
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 456 (2009).
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may be tenable, when we look at this harm more traditionally, the creation of a risk
of this harm need not be a harm itself.
Perhaps we should look, instead, at the harms that would occur if the risk from
the bullets materializes, including reactions to any misses once the person at risk
becomes aware. These events might produce a variety of harms. We could then
discount the expected harms from each possibility by the likelihood of its occurrence
and combine the assortment of discounted possibilities. This prices the overall risk,
in a sense putting it in terms of an economic harm. Existing law uses this approach
for such things as setting damages for wrongful exposure to toxic substances, when
physical or other likely harms have not yet ripened.199
To stand back, in the context of risk, we generally think of a harm as something
that a risk produces. If the risk did not, or has not yet, come to fruition, we speculate
as to the harms that would have been produced if it had, or will be produced if it
does. Then we discount the value of the possible harms by the magnitude of the risk.
As part of this calculation, we include the harms produced by the reactive responses
to the knowledge of the risk, either by the person at risk or third parties.200 We
should also consider the knowledge of the agent producing the risk. When the agent
becomes aware of the potential consequences of her conduct, to continue it may
cause a dignitary harm. The agent is diminishing the practical choice options of a
knowledgeable party at risk, thereby curtailing that person’s autonomy.201
Depending on the circumstances, by knowingly imposing the risk the agent chooses
to use the party at risk as a means only. At some point, then, the risk may reach a
magnitude where we declare it a wrongful dignitary harm, irrespective of the
absence of other types of harms.202 Again, knowledge of the risk by someone, either
the central two parties or third party observers, is crucial. Absent knowledge of the
risk, is the creation of the risk a harm in itself? Some commentators answer yes,203

199

See generally DOBBS, supra note 100, at 434-41 (lost chance rule and increased risk

rules).
200

Ripstein notes that exposure to unrealized risks generates disadvantages. “Sometimes
risks create reasonable fears; sometime they lead others to treat me differently. Sometimes
serious risks of serious harms will cause fear; in such circumstances, the creator of the risk
may be held liable, but is liable not for the risk but for fear.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 76.
201

See supra notes 196, 197.

202

That an agent’s knowledge that she is violating another person’s rights may give rise to
a dignitary harm is lost sight of by Gardner and Shute who contend that a rape is harmless
when the victim is unaware of the rape and suffers no physical or psychic harm from it. See
John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongfulness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 193, 195-99 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
203
“The passengers flying in a defective plane have been harmed by the increased risk of
death or bodily injury they suffered, and that remains the case whether or not they knew they
had been exposed to it.” Finkelstein, supra note 186, at 971. “If a harm is a setback to a
legitimate interest, it should not be difficult to see why a risk of harm is itself a harm, for it is
not difficult to make the case that exposure to risk is a setback to a legitimate interest.” Id. at
972. For others who agree, see supra note 202; Fried, supra note 191, at 245-46 (“The victim
of an attempted murder need not know the attempt has been made for us to conclude that the
attempt was wrongful.”).
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while others suggest not.204 If knowledge of a risk is required for it to be considered
a harm, how much knowledge is needed? Suppose we tell a person that during the
course of her life she will be unknowingly put at (substantial) risk by another’s
conduct. “Would you now be willing to pay something to avoid this risk?” “Yes, the
greater the risk, the more I would pay!” Is this response to the diffuse knowledge
enough for the risk to be considered a harm? A wrongful harm? Again, the answers
to these questions by thoughtful, reasonable people may differ.
When known to the person put at risk, a particular risk may produce psychic or
dignitary harms, and even physical or economic harms, depending on that person’s
response. This may be the case despite the actual ignorance by the agent that she
produced the risk and whether or not the risk ripens. Furthermore, a risk may
produce substantial harms to a person who is put at risk who is never made aware of
it, as where third parties see the conduct creating the risk and perceive it as
disrespectful or a threat to themselves.205
Fortunately for my endeavor, these difficult issues need not be resolved in the
abstract. Whether a particular risk is itself a harm, or whether knowledge of the risk
by the actor, the person at risk, or third parties is enough to make it a harm itself,
need not be answered in a vacuum when deciding what risk maxims to adopt. As
long as the maxims meet the categorical imperative, the maxims declare whether a
risk produces wrongful harms and what the requitals for the harms will be.206
Certainly at some point it is reasonable to declare the harms wrongful. This section
explores a few plausible maxims for drawing these lines. Before this exploration, I
first categorize risks according to their temporal relationship to possible harms. Past,
present (occurrent), and future risks sometimes produce different types of harms or
produce them in different ways.
a. Past, Present (Occurrent), and Future Risks
Before exploring plausible maxims addressing risky conduct, I first categorize
risks according to their temporal relationship to possible harms. Past, present
(occurrent), and future risks sometimes produce different types of harms or produce
them in different ways.
Occurrent risk refers to the harms that occur when a risk is first manifested but
before it is known whether the risk will materialize. Examples include assault as a
precursor of battery,207 negligent driving, and a criminal attempt at a targeted person.
Included are some of the risks of harms from violations of truth telling, promise
keeping, reliance, expectation, exploitation, and other maxims before they eventuate.
204
In the “‘fear of cancer’ cases . . . damages are for psychiatric effects stemming from the
knowledge of potential disease, and not for the exposure to risk itself.” JENNY STEELE, RISKS
AND LEGAL THEORY 117 (2004). “[E]xamples [of “risk harm”], such as exposure to a risk of
developing cancer, make sense only if the victim both perceives the risk and feels a
psychological setback.” Sheila B. Scheuerman, Against Liability for Private Risk-Exposure,
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 724 (2012) (citation omitted).
205
For example, third parties may shun a person who is unaware that she was put at risk of
a contagious disease. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
206

I may be too quick in trying to finesse these problems. For more on one of them, see
infra text accompanying notes 216-217.
207

Blackstone refers to assault as “inchoate violence.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at 120.
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For instance, while dignitary and psychic harms, among others, may result from a
statement alone by a promisor that she will not give promised aid to the promisee if
needed (e.g., bodyguard, insurer), further harms might turn on whether the
underlying risk materializes. Generally, as for assault, a person must be aware of an
occurrent risk to suffer a cognizable harm under existing law.208 If she is not aware
of the occurrent risk, she will not suffer immediate physical, economic, or psychic
harms. She may, however, still suffer a defamatory, dignitary harm if others are
aware of it where, for instance, observers see an agent disrespectfully throw a shoe at
a person. If a party put at risk does not learn of it until after the risk has dissipated,
requital for harms from past or future risk may still obtain. If she never learns of it,
the harm, if any, is exclusively to, or a consequence of, third parties reactions when
they become aware of the risk imposition.
Occurrent risk may cause psychic harm (e.g., fright), and dignitary harm (e.g.,
insult, defamation). It may also cause physical and economic harms, as where a
person reacts to a perceived risk by dropping or running into something.209 The
protected interest is purely dignitary when requital for an occurrent risk holds in the
absence of other harms (e.g., assault).210 Although it seems unlikely that insult would
be among the immediate conscious reactions when one sees a tossed object flying
toward her, nevertheless, the act may be defamatory or otherwise disrespectful. The
psychic harm from feelings of insult is more likely to fall within the harms of a
contemplated past or future risk.
If an occurrent risk does not materialize, it is normally not legally requitable
under existing private law (e.g., tort relief for negligent driving itself). A purely
deontic legal system would, it seems to me, be open to such proscribing maxims.
Among the concerns that give the legal community and deontologists caution about
such maxims are evidentiary, floodgates, slippery-slope, and nuisance-suit problems.
In American and common-law systems, the requital for occurrent risks sometimes
falls within, is subsumed by, protections for past risks that have materialized and
future risks.211 Once negligent driving causes an accident, the invadee can recover
208

See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 100, at 63; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 44.

209

See, e.g., Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 49 A. 450, 451 (N.J. 1901) (allowing recovery
when the plaintiff, “[a]cting under the impulse of fear,” injured herself while fleeing from a
risk that would not have materialized).
210

Prosser refers to assault as causing a “mental” injury or invasion. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 60, at 43. This is consistent with the requirement that the invadee be aware of, “in
apprehension of”, the threat as it occurs. See id. at 43-44. But it is not consistent with the
standard rule that the invadee need not be in fear. See id. at 44. When there is no such psychic
harm, as I would label it, or other standard harm, then it appears the harm being protected is
dignitary only. See generally DOBBS, supra note 100, at 63-65.
211
In justifying her view that an unrealized risk is a harm in itself, Finkelstein addresses
troublesome issues, such as whether a person can recover for a risk prior to materialization as
well as for the additional harm if it does materialize. To avoid this “double counting” she
advances the “Absorption Thesis”: “Outcome harm and benefit, in short, result in antecedent
risks or chances being absorbed into the resulting harms and benefits.” Finkelstein, supra note
186, at 993. Similarly, “[i]t is assumed that [an] incomplete attempt merges with the crime or
the completed attempt.” Larry Alexander & Kimberly K. Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes:
Retribution or Prevention?, in SEEKING SECURITY: PRE-EMPTING THE COMMISSION OF
CRIMINAL HARMS 103, 117 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (questioning this
assumption).
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for harms from the past risk (e.g., painful psychic reactions, damages to person and
property) and, possibly, future risks (e.g., ongoing fright from the accident
preventing the invadee from further driving, physical disabilities that increase
various future risks).212
With respect to past risk, once the immediate risk is over, whether or not it
materialized, harms may still occur from retrospection.213 These harms may be of all
types: physical (e.g., reactive illness); economic (e.g., work missed from trauma);
psychic (e.g., fright from “near misses”); and, dignitary (e.g., insult and defamation
once the invadee and others learn of a purposive, past risk).
Turning to future risk, after an immediate risk has passed, harms may occur from
prospection.214 Again, these harms may be of all types: physical (e.g., illness from
insecurity); economic (e.g., expenditures for protections); psychic (e.g., increased
feelings of insecurity); and, dignitary (e.g., perception that invader is disrespectful
and her insulting, defamatory conduct may recur).
Once an agent imposes a risk on another person, it may be more likely that the
agent will further impose another such risk.215 Punishment for recidivism takes this
into account. The future risk may be to the party who had been put at immediate risk,
other identifiable parties, the general public, or some combination. Even a past risk
to no one or to the agent alone, as where she drives recklessly on her own property
without any other person around, may signal a comparable, increased future risk to
others.216 As an empirical matter she may be more likely to drive recklessly in a less
isolated environment.
b. Maxims Addressing Risky Conduct
Let us look at some plausible maxims regarding risk imposition, starting with the
most general: “Do not impose a risk on others.” This maxim is too broad.217 It
creates a realm of strict, even absolute liability. Agents are not granted sufficient
scope to exercise their liberty by choosing conduct based on adequate information
212

See DOBBS, supra note 100, at 1047-53.

213

Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm 221, 233, in PERSPECTIVES
CAUSATION (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
214

ON

See id. at 226.

215

“‘[C]riminal law’ deals with what we might call the right of extended self defense . . . .
[C]riminal law involves using force to respond to threats of future rights violations . . . .”
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 190 (1998); see Randy E. Barnett, Getting
Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157,
160, 165 (1996); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying
Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 146 (2011).
216
Would not a parent whose children played along the boundary road with this reckless
neighbor, instruct the kids to stay well away from the road even though the neighbor’s risks
from driving had not yet come to fruition? Ripstein seems to analyze this scenario differently;
“By imposing a risk on you, I endanger what is yours, but I do not deprive you of it. You are
still as free as ever to use what is yours to set and pursue your own purposes.” Ripstein, supra
note 35, at 77. Zipursky agrees with Ripstein. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
Perhaps I misunderstand this point. No parent would say: “Sure, kids, you can play along the
neighbor’s road. If worse comes to worst, we can get full compensation.”
217

Applicable requital maxims could limit the reach of this substantive maxim.
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about potential normative consequences and freedom from coercive forces.
Therefore, an abridging agent may not have been responsibility blameworthy. Nor
may she be disrespect blameworthy regarding the party at risk. To the contrary, such
extensive strict liability would be, it seems, disrespectful of the agent. This balance
between liberty and security overvalues security.218 Whether or not the risk
materializes, the maxim smacks of absolute outcome responsibility.
“Do not [intentionally, purposively] impose an unreasonable [foreseeable] risk
on others.”219 Contrary to what might be entailed by an unreasonable risk, the
imposition of a reasonable risk on another person does not use her as a means only.
It is not disrespectful. Under reasonable risk maxims the other person is entitled to
impose a comparable risk back on the imposer. The liberty-security balance is
reciprocal. It reflects equal respect. It is fair.220
The concept of “reasonable” is fundamental to these maxims. There are many
conceptions of this key term. Under the individualized view taken here, one person’s
“reasonable” may be another person’s “unreasonable.”221 People may, for one, have
differing risk dispositions, one being risk-preferring and the other risk-averse.
218
“[T]he cost of avoiding all behavior that involves risk of harm would be unacceptable.
Our idea of ‘reasonable precautions’ defines the level of care that we think can be demanded:
a principle that demanded more than this would be too confining, and could reasonably be
rejected on that ground.” SCANLON, supra note 143, at 209. “Risk impositions thus pit the
liberty of injurers against the security of victims and the law of accidents sets the terms on
which these competing freedoms are reconciled. Its task is to find and fix terms that are fair.”
Keating, supra note 31, at 23. “The view is Kantian because of the way that it articulates these
ideas of freedom and fairness.” Id.
219
Alexander argues that “the core criminal injunctions will be of the type ‘do not create
an unjustifiable risk of harm X,’ where X designates the type of interest protected.” Larry
Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 28 (1994). “The negligence
standard entails dividing the possible consequences of the defendant’s acts into those that are
the materialization of a substantial risk and those that are not.” Weinrib, supra note 189, at
520.
220
“Issues of interpersonal risk imposition are fundamentally matters of fairness, not
matters of efficiency . . . . [I]t is fair when so doing is to the long run expected advantage of
the person imperiled.” Keating, supra note 31, at 30.
221

Existing law, as legal economists emphasize, concretizes “reasonable” conduct
satisfying the negligence standard by the Hand formula. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 371 (1990). The formula comes from United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Moore’s words, “[o]ne must . . . ‘balance the
evils’ to decide whether an act is negligent or reckless.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 676. The
Hand formula is interpreted as relying upon Kaldor-Hicks efficiency whereby risk must be
justified by a cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., KLAUS MATHIS, EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE?
153 (Deborah Shannon trans., 2009). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is outside the high walls of
Kant’s realm. It allows individuals to be used as a means for overall social welfare advances.
Still outside the walls, but closer, is Pareto superiority, under which trades are allowable so
long as at least one person is made better off and no one is made worse off. See, e.g., Lewis
Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law § 5.2 (“The Pareto Criterion”), STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/ (last
visited May 8, 2016). “Pareto efficiency is completely unconcerned with distribution of
utilities (or of incomes or anything else), and is quite uninterested in equity.” AMARTYA SEN,
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 504 (2002). “The test [of the Hand formula] . . . pivots not on the
equality of the parties to the transaction but on the surplus that one party realizes at the
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A version of the maxim, “do not impose foreseeable, unreasonable risks on
others,” is commonly adopted by existing law, but with a major qualification often
added: the risk must materialize for the harm to be legally injurious. As mentioned
before, for some risks, such as tortious or criminal assault and criminal attempts, the
risk, or known risk, alone is remediable,222 but for other risks, including negligence,
the risk must eventuate for the imposee to obtain a requital. Legal damages are an
element of the legal claim.223 These typically exclude psychic and dignitary harms
standing alone. When a risk alone is protected, and it materializes, as where an
assault leads to a battery, there may be two, or more, violated maxims.224
Under existing law, whether an unreasonable risk produces a wrongful harm,
either in the private or the public, criminal, sphere, is complicated. In tort law, an
issue is whether the imposition of an unreasonable risk that eventuates must be to a
expense of others.” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 48. For objections to Weinrib’s point, see
Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698, 704-05 (1996)
(book review). “The problem is that in the Learned Hand Formula, the degree of security to
which the victim is entitled is entirely a function of the degree to which the potential injurer
values his liberty . . . . [Therefore this standard is] in violation of the criterion of fairness, and,
thus, corrective justice.” Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections
on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 183, 206 (footnote
omitted). “The Learned Hand Test is inappropriate to the practice of tort law because it runs
afoul of the principle that best explains tort law – namely, the principle of corrective justice.”
Id. “The Hand test misses out on important structural features of negligence liability;
moreover, it does so because it is at odds with the core idea that one party may not set the
terms of interaction unilaterally.” Ripstein, Philosophy, supra note 97, at 679. Zipursky also
objects that the Hand formula “do[es] not capture the meaning of ‘negligence’ or ‘ordinary
care’ in our negligence law.” Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, supra note 111, at 1256. See
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 1999-2002 (2007). To
raise another problem with the Hand formula, under its economic interpretation, it gives equal
weight to the probability of the risk and the loss that would ensue if the risk materializes. A
deontic conception of reasonable risk might not do this. The degree of the autonomy space
reduction from a risk may be weightier than its probability, or vice versa. For example, a ten
percent risk of death may be more than twice as invasive as a five percent risk. A ten percent
risk of losing all of one’s resources may be more than twice as invasive as a ten percent risk of
losing half of one’s resources. As for invasiveness, along with marginal effects, other
weighting factors may include whether the harm is to hypothetical, formal, or material
autonomy space. See Kuklin, supra note 1, at 408-14.
222

In cases for which the risk alone is said to be remediable, arguably the risk has come to
fruition, either from the knowledge of the imposee (tortious assault) or the reactive responses
and increased future risk to the public (criminal assault). “If, without intending harm, I act in a
way that I realize might injure you or damage your property, I endanger your physical security
or property . . . . The criminal law protects these interests against such endangerment.” DUFF,
supra note 191, at 148 (noting that “English and American law have no general offence of
unconsummated endangerment analogous to the law of attempts.”). Contrary to my view, Duff
does not see endangerments necessarily as harms. “If the risk is not actualized, I merely
endanger him; if it is actualized, I endanger him and harm him.” Id. at 151.
223

“In principle, the division between wrongs actionable per se and those only actionable
upon proof of consequential loss should reflect a choice between those rights which are, and
are not, as a question of social fact sufficiently important to be deserving of protection
irrespective of the consequences of violation.” STEVENS, supra note 41, at 89.
224

But, for fear of double counting, there may only be one remedy. See supra note 209.
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person foreseeable at the time of the conduct, or whether an unreasonable risk to the
world at large, once it materializes, will suffice.225 Some risks of harm to particular
or random, unidentifiable individuals, impose immediate risks to the general public
(e.g., negligent driving, reckless endangerment). These risks may warrant
independent claims by the public in the form of criminal prohibitions whether or not
the risks come to pass.226 Criminal proscriptions can be distinguished from civil
proscriptions by holding an agent responsible for wrongful risks of harm to
unforeseeable persons in the criminal context only.
“Do not impose [foreseeable] nonreciprocal risks on others.” While
“nonreciprocal” risks could fall within the ambit of “unreasonable” risks, I separate
out these plausible maxims because of the prominence of the idea of nonreciprocal
risks in the legal literature.227 George Fletcher was the first to advance this
principle.228 The standard of nonreciprocal risks resonates in various areas of the
law, as in the doctrine of “live and let live,”229 and the interpretation of Rylands v.
Fletcher whereby strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities does not apply to
customary land uses.230 It also suggests the Golden Rule, though Kant balks at

225

See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

226

For the Model Penal Code section on reckless endangerment, see supra note 193.

227

“Fairness ideas – social contract ideas – in tort theory have long been associated with
the idea and criterion of reciprocity of risk.” Keating, supra note 192, at 202 (footnote
omitted); see id. at 202-04.
228

“The general principle . . . [found in tort] doctrinal standards is that a victim has a right
to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from those
created by the victim and imposed on the defendant – in short, for injuries resulting from
nonreciprocal risks.” Fletcher, supra note 105, at 542. “[T]he effect of contributory negligence
is to render the risks again reciprocal, and the defendant’s risk-taking does not subject the
victim to a relative deprivation of security.” Id. at 549 (footnote omitted). Fletcher analogizes
his “paradigm of reciprocity” to Rawls’s “first principle of justice . . . : we all have the right to
the maximum amount of security compatible with a like security for everyone else.” Id. at 550
(footnote omitted). Moore sees Fletcher’s analysis as an example of where corrective justice
requites the injustice “when one party is unjustly enriched by his own behaviour vis-à-vis
another, which unjust enrichment may take the form . . . of the less tangible benefit of
asymmetrical risk imposition.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 6 (footnoting Fletcher).
Even in his seminar article, Fletcher recognizes there are difficulties with his principle
of nonreciprocity. For example, see Fletcher, supra note 105, at 549, 570-72. The principle
has drawn a great deal of attention from commentators, much of it critical. See, e.g., JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 262 (2010); Coleman, Legal Theory, supra note
93, at 2612-13, 2616-17; Englard, supra note 93, at 66; Adam Slavny, Nonreciprocity and the
Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (2014). See generally
Keating, supra note 31; Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 27.
229

See supra note 93 and accompanying text. “[T]he reciprocity of mutual imposition and
tolerance – the idea that one should ‘give and take, live and let live’ – preserves the equality of
the interacting property owners.” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 194 (citation omitted).
230

Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (Cairns, L.C.); see PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 60, at 545-46; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e) (1977) (considering as a
factor for abnormally dangerous activities the “inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on”).
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interpreting the categorical imperative in this way.231 A maxim that allows the
imposition of reciprocal risks seems to get through the filter of the categorical
imperative. An agent is not using another as a means only, is not disrespectful, when
imposing a risk on another person that is no greater than the comparable risk the
other person may impose on the agent. This could even apply to great risks mutually
imposed.232 Reciprocal risks, especially when they are reasonable, strike a fair
balance between liberty and security interests.233
6. Miscellaneous Substantive Maxims
Before looking at the broadest category of substantive maxims—norms—I
briefly mention a few other types of plausible maxims to show the breadth of
concerns that can fit within the big tent of the categorical imperative. They have
generally fallen outside common law doctrines. This survey is very far from
exhaustive.
“Do not disrespectfully discriminate because of a person’s innate
characteristics.”234 For purposes of respecting a person’s equal dignity, this would
disallow discrimination on grounds of such traits as race, religion, caste, ethnicity,
231

While some forms of the categorical imperative, and other arguments by Kant, are
suggestive of the Golden Rule, Kant specifically distinguished them and found the Golden
Rule wanting. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 37, at 80 n.*. Under Kant, “[w]hat is
wrong with the Golden Rule (in both its positive and negative versions) is that as stated it
allows our natural inclinations and the special circumstances to play an improper role in our
deliberations.” JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 199 (Barbara
Herman ed., 2000). Parfit thinks that Kant was wrong to be so dismissive of the Golden Rule.
See 1 PARFIT, supra note 129, at 321-30.
232

Hanging over the permissibility of imposing great risks is the Consent Principle. See
supra text accompanying note 71. The consenters must know well enough what they are
getting into.
233
“When reasonable risks are reciprocal, each member of the community that imposes
and is exposed to them: (1) relinquishes an equal amount of freedom; (2) gains an equal
amount of security; and (3) gains more in the way of freedom than they lose in the way of
security.” Keating, supra note 31, at 31 (discussing Fletcher’s account). “Reciprocity of
reasonable risk imposition thus defines a circumstance where risk is fairly distributed.” Id. at
33; see also id. at 63-64.
Maxims that allow the imposition of reasonable or reciprocal risks may
not satisfy all fair-minded people. An agent may ask, “why should I be held to a reasonable
person or reciprocal risk standard when I prefer another risk maxim, or none at all?” But see
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 146 (“Consent is not a necessary condition of moral obligation. If the
mutual benefit is clear enough, the moral claims of reciprocity may hold even without an act
of consent.”). I have another view of what is a reciprocal risk, I have another degree of risk
tolerance (disposition), I prefer the social welfare consequences of another balance, I believe it
is more virtuous to tolerate more risk than one imposes, etc.” Here as elsewhere, these
challenges raise political questions. As Ripstein states, “A particular objective standard is
always an expression of particular views about the importance of various interests. As a result,
in an important sense, it is always political, and in principle subject to contest.” Ripstein,
supra note 27, at 88.
234
“The other way [beyond insulting conduct] that law protects dignity is by prohibiting
invidious discrimination.” Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, in 29 THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 207, 234 (Suzan Young ed., 2011).
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disability, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identification. Especially
worrisome is discrimination owing to qualities for which the person is not
blameworthy, is not responsible, and does not deserve. Some types of discriminatory
conduct (e.g., racial) are particularly disrespectful because of their significance in
light of existing or historical social practices.235 On the other hand, denying a person
a place on a high school basketball team because she is an innate klutz need not be
done offensively. Hence, “do not disrespectfully discriminate . . . . .” Refinement of
this plausible maxim is necessary.
“[Reasonably] preserve natural resources [the environment].” The justification
for these maxims looks largely to physical, economic, and psychic harms to others,
including future generations. The Lockean proviso is off the table.236 New frontiers
for the disadvantaged and disaffected are no longer in sight. Many things that we are
doing to our planet impact others. When our damage to the planet becomes
irreparable, it may also produce dignitary harm.237 One might argue that the implicit
claim of a right to harm the planet denies the moral equality of future persons who
will suffer the consequences.238 For those currently living, even a claim for a
reciprocal right may be disrespectful to those who have no realistic opportunity to
exercise or benefit from it, as where egregious air polluters would grant everyone the
right to so pollute.
“Undertake [easy, reasonable, safe] rescues.” These maxims expand security
interests. They stem from respect.239 A maxim requiring easy rescues does not,
235

See SCANLON, supra note 87, at 72-74.

236

See LOCKE, supra note 95, at 291 (“Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land,
by improving it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good
left; and more than the yet unprovided could use.”).
237

For various Kantian justifications for environmentalism, see, for example, MATTHEW C.
ALTMAN, Kant’s Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics, in KANT AND APPLIED
ETHICS 45 (2011); PAUL GUYER, Duties Regarding Nature, in KANT AND THE EXPERIENCE OF
FREEDOM 304 (1996); John Martin Gillroy, Kantian Ethics and Environmental Policy
Argument: Autonomy, Ecosystem Integrity, and Our Duties to Nature, 3 ETHICS & ENV’T 131
(1998); Marc Lucht, Does Kant Have Anything to Teach Us About Environmental Ethics?, 66
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1 (2007).
238
The moral claims here are quite complicated. See, e.g., RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (Ernest Partridge ed., 1981); Edith Brown Weiss,
Implementing Intergenerational Equity, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010); Anthony D’Amato et al.,
Agora: What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global
Environmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 190 (1990); Joseph Heath, The Structure of
Intergenerational Cooperation, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (2013); Bradford C. Mank,
Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a “Republican”
Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444 (1996); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009); Joseph Mazor, Liberal Justice, Future People, and Natural
Resource Conservation, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 380 (2010); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
941 (1999).
239

“[A]s Kant well recognized, a general moral duty of mutual aid, requiring supplying a
great need to another (for example, saving life) when at minimal cost to the agent, would be
universalized as a moral principle of obligation and duty.” David A.J. Richards, Human Rights
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arguably, unduly interfere with an agent’s liberty.240 When rescues entail
nonconsensual positive duties, the common law has been reluctant to require
them,241 unless, generally, the agent has caused, negligently or otherwise, the need
for the rescue, or has a special relationship with the person in need.242
“Reciprocate benefits.” With this plausible, unqualified substantive maxim, I
may have gone too far. Unless the benefit was overtly sought, this seems to have
taken us out of the realm of Kant’s perfect, consensual duties and into his realm of
imperfect ones. For Kant, imperfect duties are duties of virtue.243 “Fulfillment of
and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1429
(1979) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 41 (L.W.
Beck trans., 1959)). “It is generally agreed that there is a duty of easy rescue . . . .” BARBARA
HERMAN, MORAL LITERACY 203 (2007). As Dworkin states:
We owe [strangers] duties of aid when that aid is crucial, when we can give it with no
great damage to our own ambitions, and, particularly, when we are directly confronted
by suffering or danger. In these circumstances, to refuse our aid would show a
contempt for other people’s lives that would deny self-respect as well.
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 300. But, “[a] rich and secure person who expects to remain rich
and secure may calculate that he or she may be likely to lose more by having to perform
nearly risk-free and costless rescues of nearby strangers than he or she realistically stands to
gain from others . . . .” R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal
Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 309 (2002). This calculation can
be forestalled by placing maxim formulators behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance. See id. at 30910.
240
“[D]emanding easy rescues does not, in fact, interfere with a person’s pursuit of his or
her own ends. Hence imposing such a demand via the criminal law does not actually abridge
anyone’s freedom.” Ripstein, supra note 83, at 779. But, Ripstein continues, tort law is not up
to the task of drawing proper lines at easy rescues: “As a result, adding such a duty to tort law
would wreak havoc with its structural core. To do so would interfere with freedom.” Id.; see
RIPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 92. Tort law does not have the resources to do the job properly, as
by qualifying the duty with such limits as “easy, reasonable, or safe”? These types of
standards thrive elsewhere in the law. Tort law and law in general, as I see it, lives on this
kind of slippery slope. Balancing liberty and security is a continuous, difficult endeavor. So be
it. If the structural core is the problem, let us revise the core if at all possible. The core is to
serve justice, not limit it. “[T]here is no argument of moral principle to support the general
failure of Anglo-American law to recognize good samaritan duties in contexts to which the
underlying moral duty of mutual aid applies.” Richards, supra note 239, at 1429 (footnote
omitted).
241

See generally DOBBS, supra note 100, at 853 (“Unless the defendant has assumed a
duty to act, or stands in a special relationship to the plaintiff, defendants are not liable in tort
for a pure failure to act for the plaintiff’s benefit.”); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 375
(“the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common
humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger”).
242

See DOBBS, supra note 100, at 856-69; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, § 56 (“Acts
and Omissions”). “[C]ourts have rigidly adhered to the rule that in the absence of some special
relationship between victim and bystander, sins of omission are never crimes.” LEO KATZ,
BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 138 (1987). Most, but not all, special relationships are
consensual. While one may only weakly consent to having children, one does not consent at
all to one’s natural and, typically, adoptive parents. Fairness, reciprocity, and other principles
may do the work in the absence of consent.
243

See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 37, at 161.
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them is merit . . . but failure to fulfill them is not in itself culpability . . . but rather
mere deficiency in moral worth . . . , unless the subject should make it his principle
not to comply with such duties.”244 If we stick with Kant on this, we must leave the
adoption of duties to reciprocate unrequested benefits to individual consciences.
While deontic maxims may not directly mandate the reciprocation of benefits,
social norms often adopt standards for such reciprocity. They range over a wide
territory. Norms distinguish among the types of benefits to be reciprocated, from
supererogatory dangerous rescues, to gifts, opportunities, hospitality, and common
courtesy. There may be a natural human disposition to reciprocate.245 From a deontic
perspective, the failure to reciprocate a granted benefit is not per se a curtailment of
the voluntary grantor’s liberty or security, nor constitute using her as a means only,
but it may be disrespectful in other ways. Social norms frame society’s and a
benefiter’s understanding of whether failure to reciprocate is disrespectful. The
frame may imply, to the contrary, that actual reciprocation is sometimes
disrespectful, as where a social or business superior gives a gift to one in a lower
position, unless, perhaps, expressed gratitude is considered proper reciprocation. In
this case reciprocation is satisfied by a requital maxim, of sorts, to show gratitude or
other nonmaterial acknowledgment, but not more.
The demand to reciprocate benefits has taken us outside the immediate realm of
deontic maxims and into the realm of norms, both social and legal. We have spent
much time there already, particularly when looking to the existing common and
criminal laws. Let us take a closer look.
7. Norms
A norm is a standard embraced by a social group that each member is expected to
follow.246 I use the term “norm” broadly to include mores, customs, conventions,

244

KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 521.

245

Reciprocity is a disposition “to return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to
make reparation for the harm we have done. Moreover, reciprocity is a fundamental virtue. Its
requirements have presumptive authority over many competing considerations.” LAWRENCE C.
BECKER, RECIPROCITY 3 (1986). That there is a human inclination to reciprocate, and expect
reciprocation, and other moral inclinations as well, see, e.g., Robert Kurzban, Biological
Foundations of Reciprocity, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY 105 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker
eds., 2003); Bailey Kuklin, The Natures of Universal Moralities, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 463
(2009).
246

“Wherever interaction is continual, dense, and valuable to participants, distinctive
patterns of behavior emerge. When deviations from these patterns provoke nonlegal sanctions,
we say that the patterns are social norms. Social norms both create options and suppress
them.” ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 203 (2000). “For norms to be social, they
must be (a) shared by other people and (b) partly sustained by their approval and disapproval.”
JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 99 (1989) (citation omitted). See generally ROBERT
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 44-68 (1997) (“Promoting Norms”); ELSTER,
supra, at 97-151 (“Social norms”); Symposium, Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100
ETHICS 725 (1990); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).
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usages, principles, rules,247 regulations, statutes, constitutions, etc.248 Although
norms are coercive by putting pressure on group members to conform to their
standards, they seem rarely so coercive as to undermine the responsibility
blameworthiness of those who are induced to comply with them.249
Norms may or may not be directly grounded on deontic principles. They may be
ancient, bottom-up practices whose origins are independent of deontic reasoning, or
any perceptible reasoning at all, or specifically based on nondeontic moral reasoning
(e.g., utility, communitarianism).250 Many norms are, at least partially, coordination
or cooperation rules or standards.251 A particular norm may initially be morally
247

“Norms, unlike rules, can be particular as well as general. Some principles as well as
rules are norms, but not all the types of rules and principles are norms. Technical rules, e.g.,
are not norms.” MacCormick & Raz, supra note 154, at 79.
248

“Sociologists and anthropologists . . . disagree about the precise definition of norms.”
ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES 238 (2001). “It is not obvious how to demarcate ethical norms
from other norms, including enforced laws, rules of etiquette, etc.” Id. For various loose
demarcations, see, for example, TUNICK, supra note 128, at 11; Robert Sugden, The Role of
Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Conventions, 17 LAW & PHIL. 377, 382 (1998).
Coleman, for example, holds that wrongfulness is a matter of social convention. See JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 334 (1992) (“reasonable care . . . is a failure to abide by
governing community norms”).
249

Ripstein bases his “reciprocity conception of responsibility” on what people “are
entitled to expect of each other.” Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 361, 361 (2004); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
250
See COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 34 (“On my view, much of the content of the firstorder duties that are protected in tort law is created and formed piecemeal in the course of our
manifold social and economic interactions. These generate conventions that give rise to
expectations among individuals regarding the kind and level of care they—we—can
reasonably demand of one another.”) (citation omitted). “The fact that a prevailing
understanding exists, even if there is no particularly good reason for it, makes it reasonable at
the time it is relied upon.” TUNICK, supra note 128, at 116. Jackendoff observes that “a sense
of morality is universal, but particular morals are not. Rather, particular moral systems are
associated with particular social groups of various sizes.” Ray Jackendoff, The Natural Logic
of Morals and of Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 379, 388 (2002).
251

“A social contract is the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a
society to coordinate their efforts.” KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 3 (2011) (understandings
including table manners, significance attached to money, driving rules, word meanings,
taboos, fashion, amount of restaurant tips). “The use of criminal law to solve co-ordination
problems like getting people to drive on the same side of the road can be justified on legal
moralist grounds because the passage of the law makes salient the solution to the problem.”
MOORE, supra note 56, at 73. For discussions of rules and law as coordination devices, see
Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the
Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 502-05 (2012) (identifying many
subscribers to this view); Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 132, at 427 n.116. Green,
however, finds that “[t]he claim that the primary or basic characteristic of law is that of a coordinative agency does not withstand examination. Such an expectation-based model opens up
what I called the ‘reality gap’ between the structure of values and the structure of
expectations.” Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 299, 322 (1983). Coordination and cooperation, though run together here, are not
identical. “‘Cooperation,’ in the sense in which it is being used here, is a technical term used
to describe situations in which a group of individuals, by exercising restraint in their pursuit of
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neutral, as is the norm to drive on the right. But the norm may take on moral
significance by, say, expanding the liberty and security of those who can depend on
conformity, or by increasing social welfare from efficiency.252 Like baseline or
default contract and tort rules, which have coordination and cooperation features,
some norms are mutable, such as the contract default rule that consideration is
gauged by fair market value and the tort limitations on nonconsensual touchings.
Other norms are immutable, such as the proscription against the waiver of the good
faith duty in contracts and the refusal to allow consensual assisted suicide.253
If a norm is directly grounded on a deontic maxim (e.g., a criminal battery
statute), then this norm does all the deontic work without the need to invoke a
second, deontic meta-norm (e.g., “obey the law [norms]”,254 “respect others’ selfregarding choices”) to bring it into the deontic sphere.255 As for a norm that is
contrary to the categorical imperative, such as one mandating discrimination on the
basis of religion or ethnicity, not even an acceptable meta-norm can legitimize it.
Dashing reliance or expectations aroused by a disrespectful norm, for instance, gets
no deontic traction. For norms not directly deontic, or deontically neutral,256 such as
some of the ones relating to voting, wearing seatbelts and helmets, taxes,257 animal
individual self-interests, is able to achieve an outcome that is better for them all.” Heath,
supra note 238, at 35 (footnoting references identifying a variety of definitions).
252

“Those who drive on the left do a moral wrong because they violate antecedently
existing moral norms against risking harm to others, and such moral wrong may legitimately
be punished.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 73.
Pallikkathayil observes that established social practices, though having benefits, “lack
the impartiality needed to establish a rightful condition. There is no mechanism for
challenging informal social norms as inconsistent with equal external freedom or for
challenging the view another person has about the proper application of a norm in a given
case.” Pallikkathayil, supra note 55, at 138-39 (calling for “an impartial decision-making
procedure for settling disputes over rights”). See TUNICK, supra note 128, at 116 (“We should
want to change [a prevailing] understanding if it is irrational, but prevailing understandings
are the measure of reasonableness at the time agreements are made.”).
253

See Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1529 (2002) (reviewing THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed.,
1999)).
254
That the deontic basis for the duty to obey the law is challengeable, see supra note 56
and accompanying text.
255

“[T]here might be a conventional meta-norm that deems publicly flouting moral norms
to be disrespectful of those present, and violation of this conventional meta-norm might then
legitimate punishment, even if violation of the underlying moral norm would not.” Alexander,
supra note 107, at 863. Alexander cautions that such a meta-norm may go too far, such as by
legitimizing the punishment of any conduct perceived as offensive, including private immoral
conduct. See id. at 863-64. At this point there occurs a conflict in prima facie
disrespectfulness: the disrespect shown to the offended observer versus the disrespect shown
to the offending agent from disallowing her private choice.
256
A norm may be deontically neutral if violation of it is not disrespectful of another
person.
257

For criminal instances of “tax evasion, bribery, obstruction of justice, and damage to
public property[,] [t]he rights of private persons are not necessarily violated . . . .” Franklin G.
Miller, Restitution and Punishment: A Reply to Barnett, 88 ETHICS 358, 359 (1978). “In
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cruelty,258 victimless crimes,259 the environment,260 and others,261 deontic metanorms are required to do work necessary to create deontic duties and, if relevant,
correlative rights. The same can be said of norms relating to Kant’s imperfect duties
of virtue, such as to be beneficent.262 They may be elevated to deontic duties with
correlative rights, as by conduct that falls within a reliance or expectation maxim.263
An adopted meta-norm puts an agent on alert about its possible indirect effects on
her autonomy space boundaries resulting from incorporation of lower-level, nondeontic norms. This allows her to make reasonable, responsible choices either by
way of adjusting the boundaries through consent, if mutable, or exercising her liberty
and defending her security within the established boundaries.

requiring a citizen to pay taxes we are not requiring her to surrender her autonomy: she will
lose the opportunity to use that money for other purposes; but she will not be giving up her
ability to determine her own actions.” DUFF, supra note 49, at 177. Well, taxes may preclude
some of her choices, thus constricting her liberty in this regard. Tax laws and others that
produce public goods will get deontic support, arguably, under the view that free riders are
disrespectful of others. They implicitly claim moral superiority.
258
That Kant offers support for animal cruelty norms, see KANT, METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS, supra note 9, at 564 (Animal cruelty “dulls [a person’s] shared feeling of their
suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very
serviceable to morality in one’s relations with other people.”); IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON
ETHICS 239-41 (Louis Infield trans. 1930) (“Duties Towards Animals and Spirits”). See
MATTHEW C. ALTMAN, Animal Suffering and Moral Character, in KANT AND APPLIED ETHICS,
supra note 237, at 13; THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Must Respect be Earned?, in RESPECT,
PLURALISM, AND JUSTICE, supra note 49, at 87, 103; Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow
Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, in 25 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 77 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2005); Onora O’Neill, Kant on Duties Regarding
Nonrational Nature, 72 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 211 (1998); Allen W. Wood, Kant on
Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature, 72 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 189 (1998).
259
“[V]iolation of paternalistic laws (such as safety helmet requirements) or moralistic
laws (e.g., the prohibition of the sale and use of contraceptives) does not benefit the offender
to the detriment of someone else. This, generally, applies to all so-called ‘victimless crimes.’”
Wojciech Sadurski, Social Justice and the Problem of Punishment, 25 ISR. L. REV. 302, 327
(1991). Other examples include laws relating to prostitution, pornography, gambling, and
recreational drugs
260

See supra note 237.

261

“[I]f we did accept that drivers might put others at a risk of threats to their autonomy in
driving too fast, then it is not the case that all instances of speeding pose such risks as
sometimes speed limits are set to conserve energy, not to increase safety.” Thom Brooks,
Autonomy, Freedom, and Punishment, 2 LEGAL THEORY CHINA 161, 165 (2011). Once,
however, a speed limit is in place, aroused expectations by others may generate wrongful risks
to them.
262

See supra text accompanying note 242.

263

Dworkin puts dignity at the center of his “associative obligations”, such as those with
respect to “my children, parents, lovers, friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens . . . .”
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 311. The answer to the question of why we have such obligations
“lies, once again, in a creative interaction between our very general responsibility not to harm
other people and the social practices that refine that responsibility . . . .” Id. Dworkin cautions
against practices where “the dignity of the party denied that special concern is compromised.”
Id. at 312.
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Because each member of a social group is expected to follow the group’s norms,
virtually by definition norms arouse reliance and expectations.264 Other types of
maxims may also create or inform duties to observe norms, such as ones about truth
telling and promise keeping, exploitation, and risk imposition. Norms are a result of
maxims or are influenced by them. Norms are also a precursor of maxims and
influence them. The core and penumbral meanings of many of the key terms in
common maxims, both first- and second-order, are interpreted or established by a
frame erected by norms. The terms “reasonable” and “foreseeable” are obvious
examples. So are more foundational terms such as “respect”, “dignity”, and
“balance”, as in “righting the imbalance” or “balancing liberty and security
interests.”
While maxims and norms are often closely linked,265 they do not have to be. A
justifiable, adopted maxim may not align with norms, as where one commits to a
higher level of reciprocity or safety precautions than required by social practices. Via
meta-norms and maxims, particularly those relating to reliance and expectations,
existing lower level norms may be overturned as new or modified practices become
more common or insistent.266 There may be an ebb and flow as values and practices
change with the times. Evolving norms regarding sexual conduct between consenting
adults provide examples. Some norms specifically rely upon meta-norms as
standards. The right of privacy, for instance, is delineated by a sphere of reasonable
expectations.267
The deontic force of consent, which is often reinforced or grounded by truth
telling and promise keeping, reliance and expectations, and other maxims, may
264

In a famous case, Judge Traynor protected reliance on a stop sign placed pursuant to an
invalid statute. “If a through artery has been posted with stop signs by the public authorities in
the customary way and to all appearances by regular procedure, any reasonable man should
know that the public naturally relies upon their observance.” Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d
777, 778-79 (Cal. 1943). “Custom also bears upon what others will expect the actor to do, and
what, therefore, reasonable care may require the actor to do, upon the feasibility of taking
precautions, the difficulty of change, and the actor’s opportunity to learn the risks and what is
called for to meet them.” PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 193 (citation omitted).
“Custom . . . draws its support from two sources – due care doctrine’s quest for salient
precautions, and the principle that reasonable reliance should not be disappointed.” Keating,
supra note 31, at 64.
265
“Legal norms fix our social expectations, and through that alter what counts as justified
wrongdoing and unjustified wrongdoing.” VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 268
(2005). Contrariwise, as Tadros sees it, sufficiently unjust social norms, such as unfair tax
laws, may justify refusal to obey when the reasons for disobedience outweigh the reasons for
obedience. See id. at 268-69.
266

“[S]ocial norms do and should evolve; deviation from a norm is one way of changing
it, perhaps in a beneficial way. Overly rigid enforcement of norms might lead to social
ossification.” Smith, supra note 96, at 780 (citation omitted).
267

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (imposing liability for
publication of information “of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public”). “I shall argue that whether an
expectation of privacy is reasonable depends on our social practices and norms.” TUNICK,
supra note 128, at 139. But in the words of Justice Harlan: “Since it is the task of the law to
form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the
expectations and risks [aroused by social practices] without examining the desirability of
saddling them upon society.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971).
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incorporate norms of a wide assortment, as where one consents to obey the laws of
the state.268 There are limits to incorporation even by explicit consent, however,
since once again, the norms must survive the deontic filter.
In sum, for norms that are not directly based on deontic maxims (e.g., drive on
the right), the categorical imperative allows for a variety of possible norms, a group
selects one of them, and consent, reliance and expectations, and other types of
maxims, deontically effectuate the selection.269 Rawls refers to the “categorical
imperative procedure” as a means of Kantian constructivism of a set of moral
norms.270 Not to be forgotten, however, is that under the individualistic analysis of
this Article, a major problem remains: While norms satisfying the categorical
imperative may be selected by groups, each individual member must somehow
consent to them, or she must herself adopt a reliance and expectation or other maxim
that makes the norms obligatory to her. Most likely, in reality, society strong-arms
her. 271
CONCLUSION
The aim of this Article is to survey the terrain that an autonomous agent in a
deontic regime must navigate to properly delineate her realm of freedom. Prudently
balancing the agent’s liberty and security interests, and those of everyone else under
the universalization principle, she embraces a complete and coherent set of
substantive maxims and, should these be violated, interrelated requital maxims. For
the requitals, corrective justice reigns in the private sphere and retribution in the
public, criminal one. The contestable notions of harm, wrongfulness, and
blameworthiness, and other associated moral concepts, must be adequately specified
to insure this endeavor produces a workable scheme. In fully mapping her autonomy
space, the agent will certainly consider morally loaded issues relating to intentional
harmful conduct, truth telling and promise keeping, reliance and expectations,
exploitation, risk imposition, and, in general, established norms. We wish her great
268
“Making a false promise does victimize the promisee, but a more persuasive
explanation than Kant gives for why it does so is that it frustrates expectations arising from a
social practice.” TUNICK, supra note 128, at 193. “[T]he promise principle dictates an
obligation only when a promise was not extracted through coercion or bad faith, but to decide
what counts as undue coercion or a lacking good faith, we may need to appeal to convention.”
Id. at 194 (invoking Atiyah, without citation).
269
For example, physical contact, such as hugging or kissing non-kin, may be proscribed
by norms in one group (i.e., considered autonomy invasions), while customary in another,
both norms being consistent with the categorical imperative. On implicit social conventions,
see EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959). Similarly, under Korsgaard’s Kantian
“Constitutional Model”, “[i]nclination presents the proposal; reason decides whether to act on
it or not, and the decision takes the form of a legislative act.” CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE
CONSTITUTION OF AGENCY 110 (2008). Might there be a second-order issue here: reliance and
expectations on reliance and expectations norms?
270
See JOHN RAWLS, Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra
note 15, at 497; see also JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 15, at 303; RAWLS, supra note 231, at 235-52 (“Moral
Constructivism”).
271
“The morally authentic person, then, is severely limited in his choice of moral
principles, and in respect to general rules that derive from social practices, it seems fair to say
that he has scarcely any choice at all.” FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 38.
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wisdom in this endeavor, for her task entails the determination of the domain of
freedom for all of us.
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